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Summary 
Whether executed as full-scale war or acts short of war, acts of aggression 
have consistently shaped the history of humankind. Acts of aggression 
would not occur if it were not for the involvement of individuals. The 
historical development of aggression in international law has seen a shift 
from a regime solely focusing on the unlawfulness of the action by States, to 
include the unlawfulness of the involvement of individuals. The topic of this 
thesis is this development and the involvement of individuals in such acts, 
with the possibility of holding them individually criminally responsible for 
the crime of aggression. 
 Article 5 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute) includes the crime of aggression along with the crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Whereas the latter three crimes all 
have been gifted definitions for the purpose of the Rome Statute, the crime 
of aggression lacks such a definition. The Rome Statute entered into force 
on 1 July 2002 and the International Criminal Court (ICC) now practises its 
de facto jurisdiction over three of the four crimes included in its Statute. 
However, de facto jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is still lacking. 
This thesis examines the main difficulties in trying to find a feasible 
provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute. It 
does so by keeping the 2009 Review Conference in mind. 
 Two main difficulties are presented; the problems of finding a definition 
of the crime and setting out the conditions under which the ICC shall 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime. The work on finding a definition has 
focused on whether a generic or a specific approach should be applied, the 
latter containing either an illustrative or an exhaustive list of acts. The trend 
in the recent debate has been an emerging consensus developing in favour of 
a generic approach. Overall, the present work on a definition is developing 
rather encouragingly. As to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
work is progressing in a far less encouraging manner. States appear to have 
their minds made up about whether a prior determination by another organ, 
like the Security Council, is necessary for the ICC to be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. At the core of this issue is the 
relationship between the ICC and the Security Council. It has been argued 
that the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’ prescribed to the Security Council by the Charter of the United 
Nations, indicates that it should have a role in the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime. In addition, concerns about potential 
infringements on the sovereignty of States have resulted in States appearing 
reluctant to find a provision. 
 As a conclusion, it is argued that States need to understand the necessity 
of political compromise, seeing as a perfect legal interpretation probably 
does not exist. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
needs to continue the eloquent work being done on a definition in addition 
to devoting more time to the question of the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Finally, the conclusion is reached that it is rather unlikely that 
the 2009 Review Conference will be able to adopt a provision on the crime 
of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute. 
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1 Introduction  
‘If the names are not correct, language is without an object. When 
language is without an object, no affair can be effected. When no 
affair can be effected, rites and music wither. When rites and music 
whither, punishment and penalties miss their target. When 
punishments and penalties miss their target, people do not know 
where they stand.’1
These words uttered by Confucius some 2500 years ago, claim that things 
should be called by their proper name and are a suitable point of departure 
when discussing the crime of aggression and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). History is rife with examples of heinous acts of aggression for 
which individuals in charge have escaped with impunity. As a firm believer 
in the idea that instigators of war or other acts of aggression should not 
escape scrutiny, the establishment of the ICC and its potential jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression has been followed with close interest. The 
crime of aggression is included in Article 5 of the Rome Statute but still 
lacks a definition enabling the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the 
crime. The Review Conference to be held in 2009 will provide the first 
opportunity for the States Parties to agree on a complete provision and 
amend the Rome Statute to include it. 
 The opinion is often voiced that the lack of a complete provision on the 
crime of aggression is not such a big deal. Central to this perspective is that 
the ICC still has the possibility to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. This may be true, seeing as there is 
a possibility that one or all of these crimes could appear parallel to the crime 
of aggression. However, they are not the same as the crime of aggression 
and as Confucius claimed, things should be called by their proper name. Just 
because the ICC could potentially hold someone responsible on account of 
crimes against humanity does not imply that the crime of aggression has not 
been committed or should go unpunished. Such a culture of impunity is 
neither in the best interest of justice nor desirable. Therefore, it is important 
not to settle for the crimes already defined for the purpose of the Rome 
Statute, but to examine the possibility of finding a feasible provision on the 
crime of aggression. 
 However, the view expressed by Confucius is also applicable to the 
problems related to finding a provision on the crime of aggression. If things 
should be called by their proper name, one must also be aware of what the 
thing consists of. Otherwise, it will be impossible to describe it, and a term 
such as ‘crime of aggression’ would just be a term devoid of meaning. 
There were extensive discussions concerning the meaning of the crime of 
aggression prior to, during and subsequent to the Rome Conference setting 
up the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. The important and interesting 
problem of what the crime really consists of will form an integral part of 
this thesis. 
 Furthermore, the establishment of the ICC with its potential jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression signified the establishment of a new organ in a 
                                                 
1 Leys, Simon, The Analects of Confucius, Chapter 13.3., p. 60. 
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world governed by the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) and its 
organs. The apparent monopoly of the Security Council on handling cases 
of aggression appears to be challenged by this new institution. The question 
of the relationship between the two organs is an interesting albeit 
contentious issue at the centre of much debate. An examination of the 
conditions under which the ICC should exercise jurisdiction over the crime 
of aggression, including whether there needs to be another organ involved, 
is therefore both interesting and highly relevant. 
 Finally, as icing on the cake we live in a world based upon the principle 
of the sovereignty of States. Just as with the Security Council, States may 
feel that a potential jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could amount 
to an infringement upon their sovereign rights. Therefore, the multitude of 
relevant ingridients of the crime of aggression transforms it into a highly 
intriguing layered ‘cake’ of international law, ready to be dissected. 
1.1 Purpose and Delimitation 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the development of the 
crime of aggression in international law. Even though the main intention is 
to focus upon recent developments related to the ICC, it is felt that the 
inclusion of a historical background will allow for a better understanding of 
this field of international law. It is the aim of this thesis is to contribute to 
the discussion concerning the possibility of a future provision on the crime 
of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute. It will do so by examining 
and pinpointing the main problem areas encountered in the work conducted 
on the issue until present time. The aim is to produce a clear picture of the 
work conducted within different timeframes, divided into the work 
conducted prior to, during and subsequent to the Rome Conference, while 
keeping the 2009 Review Conference in mind. Seeing as a summary 
including the most recent work appears to be lacking in the present 
discussions on the issue, this thesis will hopefully fill that gap and work as a 
useful summary of the action exercised on the crime of aggression until 
present time. In addition, this study can potentially be seen as a status 
report, indicating what line of action may be necessary in the future. 
Therefore, the following questions will form the basis of this thesis: 
•  Has aggression developed into a crime of international law entailing 
individual criminal responsibility? 
•  What are the main difficulties in trying to find a feasible provision on 
the crime of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statue of the 
International Criminal Court, in accordance with Article 5(2)? 
•  Is it likely, or even desirable, that the 2009 Review Conference will 
produce a feasible provision on the crime of aggression, i.e. where do 
we stand today? 
Even though this thesis is devoted to the crime of aggression, i.e. the 
responsibility of individuals, the act of aggression by States, i.e. the 
responsibility of States, also needs to be considered. However, this will only 
be done to the extent that it is of interest to the former and will not be 
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discussed at length. At the centre of attention for this thesis are two main 
problem areas, a definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise 
of jurisdiction over the crime. Other areas such as detailed elements of the 
crime and its relationship to the other parts of the Rome Statute might be of 
interest, but will only be discussed to the extent that they are of interest to 
the main problem areas. Finally, the intention or goal of this thesis is not to 
produce a draft proposal for a provision, but instead to present a 
recommendation on what line of work that needs to be followed. 
1.2 Method and Terminology 
In order to fulfil the aim of amounting to a useful summary, the majority of 
this thesis consists of descriptive and chronologically ordered sections 
covering the development on the crime of aggression in international law, 
including the work that has been carried out in relation to the ICC. 
However, analytical parts are included throughout to present a more 
interesting reading of the topic chosen. Even if the work on trying to find a 
feasible provision on the crime of aggression is largely concerned with 
examining international law de lege lata, the fact that a provision on the 
crime of aggression is still lacking naturally puts some of the discussion into 
a de lege ferenda perspective. 
 It is necessary to clarify some of the language used in this thesis. As a 
main rule, the term act of aggression is used to describe acts by a State that 
could result in State responsibility for the State in question. The crime of 
aggression is used to describe the involvement of individuals in such acts 
that could result in individual criminal responsibility for the individual 
concerned. Individual criminal responsibility is preferred over the 
commonly used term of individual accountability as the former is the term 
used in the Rome Statute. This terminology is used to the extent possible. 
However, the notion of aggression inescapably interrelates with terms such 
as use of force, as contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, crimes 
against peace and war of aggression, used in the Nuremberg Charter and 
armed attack, appearing in Article 51 of the UN Charter. It is difficult to 
avoid using these terms altogether, and the reader needs to be aware of the 
similarity of terms existing in this field of international law. 
1.3 Material 
A great variety of materials has been used to produce this thesis. Primary 
sources such as international treaties, like the Rome Statute itself, customary 
international law, with General Assembly Resolutions used as indicators, 
and general principles of international law have all been a natural part of 
this thesis. However, the materials most useful to describe the topic chosen 
and most frequently used have been subsidiary sources. For instance judicial 
decisions, in particular the Nuremberg Judgment and the Nicaragua Case, 
and various forms of legal academic works have been central to the 
completion of this thesis. Concerning the legal academic works, in the form 
of books as well as articles, not much has been written on the development 
of the work on the crime of aggression in the last couple of years. A notable 
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exception and an interesting contribution to the present debate is an article 
written in 2005 by Mark S. Stein entitled ‘The Security Council, the 
International Criminal Court, and the Crime of Aggression: How Exclusive 
is the Security Council’s Power to Determine Aggression?’. 
 Generally, the works of Ahmed M. Rifaat and Yoram Dinstein have 
been useful to put the crime of aggression into a historical context and to 
describe its necessary nexus with acts of aggression and individual criminal 
responsibility. Furthermore, Matthias Schuster’s article ‘The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian 
Knot in Search of a Sword’ has been useful to highlight potential problems 
in trying to find a suitable provision on the crime of aggression. Whether or 
not one agrees with his drastic conclusion of removing the crime of 
aggression from the Rome Statute it is still an excellent reading for those 
interested in potential problems arising out of the conflict with the security 
mechanisms of the United Nations system. 
 Finally, documents from different working groups concerned with the 
crime of aggression and the ICC, such as the Working Group on the crime 
of aggression within the Preparatory Commission and the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, has been frequently used. Without these 
sources, it would be impossible to describe how the work on the crime of 
aggression has progressed in recent years. 
1.4 Outline 
Following this introductory chapter is chapter two containing a historical 
background on the crime of aggression. In this chapter, the crime of 
aggression is put into perspective by giving a chronological summary 
tracing it is far back as the ideas of Aristotle. Furthermore, the concepts of 
State responsibility and individual criminal responsibility in relation to 
aggression are presented. The chapter concludes by explaining the link to 
the United Nations and its various organs, and by giving a brief view on the 
possible existence of the crime of aggression as customary international law. 
 The third chapter is devoted to the crime of aggression and the ICC. As 
a first part, the work conducted on the crime of aggression prior to the Rome 
Conference and the adoption of the Rome Statute is presented, including 
different draft proposals on an international criminal court and the work of 
the Preparatory Committee. Following this is a part on the work in direct 
relation to the Rome Conference, explaining the divergent views on whether 
or not the crime of aggression should be included and how the crime of 
aggression was finally included but not defined. The third part presents the 
work conducted subsequent to the Rome Conference and contains the 
elaborations on the crime of aggression by two different working groups 
established by the Preparatory Commission and the Assembly of States 
Parties respectively. Again, the chronological order is followed, thus the 
latter part of the chapter focuses on where the most recent work is heading. 
 States reluctant to adopting the Rome Statute, and even more so to 
finding a provision on the crime of aggression, often voice their concerns on 
issues of the sovereignty of States. Therefore, the fourth chapter focuses on 
the possible concerns of infringement upon the sovereignty of States. As a 
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result, issues such as anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence and 
humanitarian intervention are examined along with the example of the 
United States as a State expressing concern over the sovereignty of States. 
 Appropriately, conclusions are presented in the fifth and final chapter. 
This chapter also presents some reflections on the conclusions as well as 
delivering a set of recommendations for future work on the crime of 
aggression. 
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2 Historical Background 
When examining aggression as a concept in international law, it is central to 
understand that the concept is by no means an altogether new one that came 
into life with the Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC. As noted 
by Ian Brownlie, the notion of aggression dates as far back as the early days 
of Greece.2 This chapter aims to introduce the historical background 
concerning the crime of aggression. Different timeframes will be examined, 
beginning in the early days of Greece to arrive at a world governed by the 
UN Charter and the possible existence of aggression as a crime of 
customary international law entailing individual criminal responsibility. 
Along the route, the possible international responsibility arising from the 
occurrence of an act of aggression will be considered both from the 
perspective of a State and of the involvement of individuals. 
2.1 The Doctrine of Aggression 
Aggression derives from the occurrence of war, which has shaped the 
history of the world for centuries. The idea that war was something that 
could be unjust surfaced early on. It can be traced as far back as Aristotle 
(384 BC-322 BC) and his ideas of just and unjust wars, to limit the resort to 
war. St. Augustine (354-430) brought the doctrine of just war to the 
forefront of the Christian world. He proposed that war should only be 
allowed for punishing wrong and to restore peace. Therefore, aggression 
was unjust and violence had to be controlled. In addition, a war that God 
himself ordained was always just.3 One of the scholastics, St. Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274), developed the doctrine of just war further. In his 
opinion, war was justified if waged by the sovereign authority, it had just 
cause, i.e. punishing wrongdoers, and the belligerents had the right 
intensions, i.e. advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Similar ideas 
also surfaced among Muslim scholars regarding permissible and 
impermissible resort to war.4 Other efforts made at this time to limit the 
waging of war included non-aggression pacts and other collective security 
arrangements between States.5
 After a period where European States had been plagued by the violence 
of religious wars came the treaties establishing the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648. The system set up through the treaties meant that States from now on 
were to be seen as sovereign and equal, excluding the possibility of one 
State judging on the just cause of another State. According to Malcolm N. 
Shaw, this resulted in that ‘the concept of the just war disappeared from 
international law as such’.6 In fact, up until and during the beginning of the 
                                                 
2 Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States, pp. 3-4. 
3 Ibid, p.5; Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in 
Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed.), International Criminal Law 1. Crimes, p. 313. 
4 Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States, p. 6. 
5 Ntanda Nsereko Daniel D., ‘Aggression under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court’, 71 NJIL (2002) pp. 497-498. 
6 Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, pp. 1014-1015. 
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twentieth century, there was a practise of war being pursued as ‘the 
continuation of diplomacy by other means’.7  
 World War I and its atrocious effects marked a significant change. 
During the Peace Conference in Versailles, the sovereign right of States to 
wage war was questioned. A central part of the final peace treaty was the 
creation of the League of Nations. The 1919 Covenant of the League of 
Nations was based on a collective security system for the maintenance of 
peace. Article 10 states that the members of the League are to respect and 
preserve the territorial and political integrity of all members from external 
aggression. However, the Covenant was mainly concerned with banning war 
while leaving the importance of aggression not entirely clear.8 In the 
opinion of Ahmed M. Rifaat, the Covenant made the notion of aggression 
equal to that of aggressive war, casting aside that the notion of ‘aggression’ 
in reality is wider than that of ‘war’. Thus, Article 10 can hardly be 
interpreted as a legal prohibition of the concept of aggression, since other 
provisions in the Covenant allow recourse to war under certain 
circumstances.9
 The discussion concerning war and aggression continued throughout the 
period between the two World Wars. In 1928, the General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy was signed, better 
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.10 It condemned recourse to war and 
renounced it as a legitimate instrument of national policy. No definition of 
aggression was included in the pact nor did it contain any sanctions in case 
of a breach.11 Yet, it would come to play a significant role during the 
Nuremberg trials.12 At a disarmament conference in 1933, the Soviet Union 
produced a proposal aimed at defining aggression by enumerating certain 
acts amounting to aggression.13 The proposal sparked interest in the League 
of Nations and its Committee on Security Questions presented a similar 
draft. However, definitional problems were encountered and with the 
outbreak of World War II and the events leading up to it, further 
elaborations were put on hold until the end of the war.14
                                                 
7 von Clausewitz, cited in Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ‘Historical developments of Prosecuting 
Crimes Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, M. Cherif (ed.), International Criminal Law 3. 
Enforcement, p. 25. 
8 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.) International Criminal Law 1. Crimes , p. 316; 1919 Covenant of the 
League of Nations reprinted in Ferencz, Benjamin B., Defining International Aggression, 
The Search for World Peace vol. 1, pp. 61-69. 
9 Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its 
Development and Definition in International Law, pp. 46-49. 
10 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 94 
LNTS 57, reprinted in Ferencz, Benjamin B., Defining International Aggression, The 
Search for World Peace vol. 1, pp. 190-193. 
11 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.) International Criminal Law 1. Crimes, p. 317. 
12 See infra chapter 2.2.2. 
13 Reprinted in Ferencz, Benjamin B., Defining International Aggression, The Search for 
World Peace vol. 1, pp. 199-204. 
14 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.) International Criminal Law 1. Crimes , p. 318. 
 10
 The end of World War II propelled the adoption of the Charter of the 
United Nations and with it, the relevance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928 diminished.15 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter stipulates: 
‘All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other matter inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.’16
The Charter differs from the Kellogg-Briand Pact and earlier discussions in 
that it prohibits the ‘threat or use of force’, unlike ‘aggression’ or ‘war’ 
which had previously been the main focal points. Despite this change in 
terminology the acts thought of were basically the same, namely to prohibit 
the essence of war. However, the change was produced to avoid technical 
discussions in a specific situation of whether or not a State was at war.17 
The term ‘aggression’ appears in Article 39 of the UN Charter, which leaves 
it to the Security Council to ‘determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, or act of aggression’ and to take appropriate actions.18 However, 
there is no definition concerning precisely what is included in the term ‘act 
of aggression’. This was done consciously because of a fear that a definition 
would be unable to cover every possible case of aggression, keeping in mind 
the development of modern warfare at the time. In any case, the drafters felt 
it was best to leave the responsibility to the Security Council to decide what 
had happened in a particular case and to decide what actions to take.19
 Besides action authorised by the Security Council, the only exception to 
the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is the right States have to 
self-defence. Article 51 of the UN Charter allows for ‘individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs…, until the Security 
Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security’.20 
 Clearly, the Security Council has been vested with the responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security in the world order governed by the 
UN Charter. This amounts to a shift from a system focused on the 
sovereignty of States and their right to wage war to a system where 
collective security is at the forefront. The role of aggression within the UN-
system and its relationship to the ICC will be discussed at length in this 
thesis, but first we will look into the notion of aggression in terms of the 
international responsibility of both States and individuals. 
                                                 
15 For a contrary opinion see Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States, pp. 75, 91-92, 113-116, who advocates the Pact as a ‘parallel and complement of the 
Charter’ in limiting resort to force by States. 
16 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNTS XVI, Article 2(4). 
17 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.) International Criminal Law 1. Crimes , pp. 320-322. 
18 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNTS XVI, Article 39. 
19 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.) International Criminal Law 1. Crimes , p. 322; Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak, 
International Criminal Law, p. 211. 
20 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNTS XVI, Article 51. 
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2.2 International Responsibility 
Following World War II, the Allied forces commenced trials in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo to try war criminals. Among the crimes defendants had to face 
was aggression, as a part of ‘crimes against peace’. A precedent for 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression was thereby 
established. However, aggression undeniably originates from acts of State in 
that it is perpetrated by and in the name of a State against another State. 
Therefore, when discussing aggression as a crime in international law it is 
necessary to examine both the responsibility of States as well as that of 
individuals. 
2.2.1 State Responsibility 
That every internationally wrongful act of a State is followed by State 
responsibility for that State is a widely accepted principle of international 
law.21 Such an act can be aggression violating the prohibition on the use of 
force as set out in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The content of the 
international responsibility of a State for violating international obligations 
involves cessation, non-repetition and reparation of the wrongs 
committed.22
 In conjunction with this delictual responsibility of States, the idea of 
attributing international criminal responsibility to States has surfaced. 
Considerable work and discussion in this area has taken place within the 
International Law Commission (ILC) and it is seems appropriate that their 
work is the main source for this discussion. While working on the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, the ILC decided to make a distinction 
between ‘international crimes’ and ‘international delicts’. Robert Ago, 
Special Rapporteur, has explained the distinction as one between ‘two 
completely different regimes’ of State responsibility. The former would 
apply to the case where a State breaches an obligation of fundamental value 
to the international community as a whole, such as acts of aggression, 
constituting an international crime. The latter would apply to less serious 
breaches of obligations not of a fundamental value, branded ‘simple 
breaches’.23
 The ILC followed this line of thought in its 1996 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. Article 19(2) defines an international crime of a State as ‘An 
internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an 
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized by that 
                                                 
21 Chorzów Factory Case (Indemnity), Merits PCIJ Series A, No. 17 p. 29; Corfu Channel 
Case, Merits ICJ Rep. (1949) pp. 12-23; see also Article 1 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts adopted by the ILC at its fifty-
third session (2001). 
22 Articles 30-31 of the 2001 ILC Draft; see also for cessation: Rainbow Warrior Case 82 
ILR, p. 573; non-repetition: LaGrand Case, ICJ Rep. (2001), pp. 508-514; reparation: 
Chorzów Factory Case (Indeminity), Merits PCIJ Series A, No. 17, pp. 47-48 and 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project Case, ICJ Rep. (1997), pp. 80-81. 
23 Ago, Robert, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility’, 1976 ILC Ybk. Vol. II Part 1, p. 26, 
para. 80. 
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community as a whole’.24 To avoid confusion on terminology, the ILC 
commented on the expression ‘international crime’ as used in Article 19 in 
relation to similar expressions found in other international instruments such 
as ‘crime under international law’ and ‘crimes against peace’. The latter 
expressions could be found in instruments requiring States to punish certain 
heinous individual crimes and might occur in conjunction with the 
international crime of a State. However, the attribution of an international 
crime to a State was explained to differ from the incrimination of 
individuals for connected actions. The ILC held that not only was the 
obligation to punish certain individual actions different from international 
responsibility applicable to a State for international crimes, but also that it 
was not the sole form of responsibility.25 Ian Brownlie has noted a number 
of penal sanctions that have been suggested for inclusion in the concept of 
the criminal responsibility of States, such as indemnities, military 
occupation, demilitarization, pacific blockade and exclusion from the 
international society of States.26
 Although the 1996 ILC Draft on State Responsibility does not allow for 
use of force or military occupation against a State committing an 
international crime, it contains far-reaching Articles on duties of reparation 
and satisfaction.27 A fair conclusion to draw from the work and discussion 
within the ILC up until and including the 1996 Draft is that the crimes of 
States and the connected criminal responsibility of States was seen as a 
different thing in international law from the criminal responsibility of 
individuals. This holds true for both the subject matter and the nature of that 
responsibility.28 Nonetheless, the inclusion of international crimes and the 
criminal responsibility of States turned out to be highly controversial and 
criticised.29 The international crimes of States were therefore excluded, 
when the ILC made the final adjustments of the Draft Articles in the 2001 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts.30 Instead, the spotlight was turned to the consequences resulting from 
breaches of obligations erga omnes and of peremptory norms, i.e. jus 
cogens norms.31
 Today, the discussion of whether States can entail criminal 
responsibility seems to have shifted from being a discussion within the ILC 
into more of an academic debate. This debate, interesting as it may be, is not 
                                                 
24 1996 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 1996 ILC Ybk. Vol. II Part 2, pp. 58-65, 
Draft Article 19 was adopted by the ILC in 1976, 1976 ILC Ybk. Vol. I, p. 253. 
25 1976 ILC Ybk. Vol. II Part 2, p. 119. 
26 Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States, pp. 150-151. 
27 1996 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 1996 ILC Ybk. Vol. II Part 2, pp. 58-73, 
Articles 41-53. 
28 Hogan-Doran, Justin and van Ginkel, Bibi T., ‘Aggression as a Crime under International 
Law and the Prosecution of Individuals by the Proposed International Criminal Court’, 43 
NILR (1996), p. 324. 
29 Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, pp. 720-721; Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression 
and Self-defence, pp. 110-111. 
30 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
adopted by the ILC at its fifty-third session (2001), text including commentaries appears in 
UN GAOR 56th Sess. Supp. No. 10 (A/56/10), pp. 43-365. 
31 See ibid, p. 283, where the ILC mentions that the prohibition of aggression should be 
regarded as a peremptory norm. 
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of great relevance to this thesis as here the main focus is on the question of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression within the 
auspices of the ICC. To sum it up, it is difficult to see how any criminal 
responsibility of States can exist, since international crimes were excluded 
from the 2001 ILC Draft and clearly, there is no opino juris in international 
law claiming that it exists. Finally, that leaves us to draw the conclusion that 
an act of aggression can entail State responsibility in the delictual sense but 
not in the criminal sense. Let the focus now be turned to the criminal 
responsibility of individuals. 
2.2.2 Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Prior to the end of World War II, the question of holding individuals 
responsible for crimes of war or aggression did not receive much attention 
as the focus was mainly on the action and possible responsibility of States. 
In 1919, with World War I just ended came the Treaty of Versailles, and it 
can be seen as the first international instrument indicating the principle of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. Article 227 
stipulated that Kaiser Wilhelm II, the former German emperor, awaited 
prosecution for the ‘supreme offense against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties’, related to German invasion of Belgium and ‘little 
Luxembourg’.32 Aggression had never before been declared an international 
crime, and it was not in conformity with the spirit of the time, where war as 
an instrument of national policy enjoyed permission.33
 Besides the fact that jurisdiction was based on dubious principles such 
as ‘international morality’, questions were raised concerning the principle of 
nulla poene, nullum crimen sine lege. As individuals had never previously 
been held criminally responsible for war or acts of aggression, the 
prosecution of the Kaiser was seen as the imposition of ex post facto law 
and therefore impermissible. In any event, as the Kaiser received asylum in 
the Netherlands, refusing to extradite him, no tribunal was held and the 
Kaiser did not have to face charges.34 To clarify things it might be 
appropriate to mention that the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for acts resembling aggression had occurred before35, but the 
Treaty of Versailles was the first time that an international instrument set 
forth the principle. 
                                                 
32 Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘The Crime of Aggression’ in Kirk McDonald, Gabrielle and 
Swaak-Goldman, Olivia (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1: Commentary, 
pp. 38-39. 
33 Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its 
Development and Definition in International Law, p. 35. 
34 Ibid; Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘The Crime of Aggression’ in Kirk McDonald, Gabrielle and 
Swaak-Goldman, Olivia (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1: Commentary, 
p 39. 
35 History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and the Development of the Law 
of War, p. 242 n. 1, citing the examples of Conrad V, found guilty of initiation of an unjust 
war and executed in Naples 1268, and on an international scale, a war crimes trial 
conducted by the Holy Roman Empire in 1474 in which Peter von Hagenbach faced 
charges for violations of the laws of God and humanity. 
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 The atrocities of World War II signalled the next step in establishing 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. The idea of 
holding individual authors responsible for their involvement in World War 
II originates from the Moscow Declaration of 1943. In it, the Allies declared 
their will to try all German war criminals for their part in the atrocities.36 
Once again, questions were raised concerning the principle of nulla poene, 
nullum crimen sine lege. The illegality of acts amounting to aggression had 
been established by previous international instruments such as the Kellogg-
Briand Pact of 1928, and was not the primary subject of the dispute. Rather, 
the discussion focused on whether such acts were considered a crime in 
existing international law prior to the outbreak of World War II, and 
whether individuals could be held criminally responsible for their 
involvement.37 The Kellogg-Briand Pact confirmed aggression as illegal 
acts of a State, but failed to mention anything on individual criminal 
responsibility. The Allied nations expressed differing views concerning 
whether international law allowed them to try individuals for the crime of 
aggression. Robert H. Jackson, an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme 
Court who would later be chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, argued that 
common sense of justice must prevail over sterile legalism.38 Others 
expressed the view that condemnation in peace-treaties were the appropriate 
way, and that it was better to develop penal sanctions for the future. 
Concerned with if German actions could be described as crimes under 
international law, British representatives went so far as to suggest that 
‘execution without trial is the preferable course’.39 The Soviet Union 
insisted on an ad hoc tribunal limited to the European Axis leaders, rather 
than a universal declaration for future application.40 It seems fair to believe 
that Soviet leaders suggested this out of concern for their own impunity. 
 Work on a suitable way of trying German war criminals continued as 
representatives of the Allies in 1945 held an International Conference on 
Military Trials in London. The problem of ex post facto law continued to be 
a significant influence during discussions and one of the major issues dealt 
with was trying to find a definition for the crime of aggression within the 
broader concept of crimes against peace. The question of whether 
individuals could be held criminally responsible for the crime was a logical 
part of the discussions. An American initiative to include a definition of 
aggression in the Charter of the Tribunal met with disapproval from the 
Soviet and French representatives.41 Finally, on 8 August 1945, the Allies, 
Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, reached a 
                                                 
36 Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its 
Development and Definition in International Law, pp. 138-139. 
37 Ibid, p. 139. 
38 Bassiouni M. Cherif and Ferencz Benjamin B, ‘The Crime Against Peace’ in Bassiouni, 
M. Cherif (ed.), International Criminal Law 1. Crimes, p. 319. 
39 Ibid; Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘The Crime of Aggression’ in Kirk McDonald, Gabrielle and 
Swaak-Goldman, Olivia (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International 
Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. 1: Commentary, 
p 42. 
40 Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its 
Development and Definition in International Law, p. 143. 
41 Ibid, pp. 143-149. 
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unified agreement on the establishment of an ‘International Military 
Tribunal’ (Nuremberg Tribunal) for the trial of the German Major War 
Criminals.42
 The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, commonly referred to as the 
Nuremberg Charter, was annexed to the London agreement, setting out the 
constitution, jurisdiction and functioning of the Tribunal.43 Article 6 gave 
the Tribunal jurisdiction over crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Paragraph (a) of the Article defines crimes against peace 
as: 
‘Namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements 
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.’44
The final paragraph clarifies the targeted group of individuals: 
‘Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by 
any persons in execution of such a plan.’45
The final wording of Article 6 was a compromise between the different 
views expressed at the London Conference. ‘War of aggression’ was given 
the status of a separate crime alongside of ‘war in violation of treaties and 
agreements’. With the inclusion of the latter, it was considered enough to 
avoid the problematical inclusion of a distinct definition of aggression.46
 The confusing formulation of Article 6 clearly leaves much to be 
desired. It seems as if too much leeway was given to the Tribunal in 
determining what types of acts of aggression to include within the 
formulation and what individuals to punish. It would have been to the 
benefit of the legality of the Nuremberg Charter if a more distinct definition 
of aggression at the time had been included. However, it must be kept in 
mind that the Nuremberg Charter was the product of a compromise between 
the Allies and their separate agendas and opinions concerning international 
law. This, of course, helps us understand why Article 6 was drafted as it 
was, but it does not remove the need for predictable penal provisions. 
 The Tribunal indicted and tried 24 major Nazi war criminals and 
delivered its ‘Nuremberg Judgment’ on 30 September-1 October 1946.47 As 
this thesis is limited to the crime of aggression, so will the examination of 
the Nuremberg Judgment be limited to the parts dealing with crimes against 
peace, as this includes the crime of aggression. Consequently, crimes 
                                                 
42 ‘Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis’, 8 August 1945, reprinted in 39 AJIL (1945), pp. 257-258. 
43 ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’, ibid, pp. 258-264 ().  
44 Ibid, p. 260. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Rifaat, Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its 
Development and Definition in International Law, p. 149; Brownlie, Ian, International Law 
and the Use of Force by States, pp. 163-164. 
47 ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’, reprinted in 41 AJIL (1947), pp. 172-332. 
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against humanity and war crimes will be left aside. In addition, it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to examine objections of Nuremberg dispensing 
‘victor’s justice’, i.e. that heinous acts of the Allies were never tried. 
Instead, let us turn our attention to the principle of legality and the 
Tribunals’ discussion on whether individual criminal responsibility for 
crimes against peace, including the crime of aggression, was accepted in 
international law at the time. 
 Not surprisingly, the Tribunal had to face arguments from the 
defendants that Article 6(a) amounted to ex post facto criminalisation, 
contrary to the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poene sine lege. The 
Tribunal explained that the Nuremberg Charter, in their view, reflected 
existing international law at the time and that it in itself contributed to the 
development of international law.48 The fact that it explicitly held a ‘war of 
aggression’ or a ‘war in violation of international treaties’ to be illegal was 
in reality sufficient for the Tribunal to try such acts. However, due to the 
important aspects of international law involved, they decided to validate it 
by expressing their view on the matter. First, the Tribunal concluded that 
‘the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is 
in general a principle of justice.’49 The defendants, occupying high positions 
in the German government, must have known that their acts of invasion and 
aggression were contrary to international law and treaties. In that case, it 
would be unjust not to punish them and therefore it appeared to the Tribunal 
as if the maxim had no application concerning the acts.50
 The Tribunal went on validating their view by explaining the state of 
affairs in this area of international law in 1939. At the outbreak of the war in 
1939, Germany was party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 condemning 
recourse to war and renouncing it as an instrument of national policy. In the 
eyes of the Tribunal, this established the illegality of wars as an instrument 
of national policy and ‘that those who plan and wage such a war, with its 
inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing’.51
 Acts amounting to a war of aggression were deemed to be included and 
therefore outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Arguments were raised that 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not expressly make such wars crimes, nor did it 
set up courts to try those accused of such acts. In an attempt to confront 
these arguments, the Tribunal made an analogy with the Hague Convention 
of 1907, prohibiting resort to certain methods of warfare. The acts banned 
by the Hague Convention had been looked upon as war crimes for a long 
time, or at least since 1907. Yet, the Hague Convention nowhere designated 
certain acts as criminal, nor did it contain any provision setting up a tribunal 
to try offenders. That had not stopped military tribunals from trying and 
punishing individuals for violations of the rules of warfare contained in the 
Convention. The Tribunal considered the criminality of acts amounting to a 
war of aggression to be analogous and even more convincing.52
                                                 
48 Ibid, p. 216. 
49 Ibid. p. 217. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, p. 218. 
52 Ibid, pp. 218-219. 
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 Express mention was made of the Treaty of Versailles that allowed the 
Allies to try the Kaiser after World War I. However, arguments continued to 
be raised that international law was concerned solely with sovereign States 
and provided no punishment for individuals. Included in this was that where 
a certain act is an act of State, individuals cannot be held responsible due to 
the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. The Tribunal refuted these 
arguments and claimed that it was duly recognised that international law 
imposed duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as States. In the eyes 
of the Tribunal ‘Crimes against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’.53 In addition, 
the principle of international law allowing for protection of representatives 
of a State was not applicable to acts deemed criminal by international law.54
 When applying the possible individual criminal responsibility to action 
taken by Germany, the Tribunal made a distinction between ‘acts of 
aggression’ and ‘wars of aggression’. The seizure of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia were considered the first acts of aggression and the war 
against Poland in September 1939 was the first occurrence of a war of 
aggression.55 Wars of aggression followed against Denmark, Norway, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet 
Union and the United States.56 The German occupation of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia was not seen as wars of aggression as such. As a result, the 
Tribunal tried the defendants for their involvement in these acts as planning 
to wage a war of aggression against other countries.57 In all the other 
mentioned cases of German aggression, the Tribunal concluded that they 
amounted to wars of aggression, even though shifting in terminology.58
 It would appear as if the vagueness of Article 6(a) could have caused 
the Tribunal a great deal of difficulty in determining whether a case of 
aggression had occurred. With the practical lack of a definition of 
aggression, instead leaving it in the hands of the Tribunal to decide, this 
could have been rather problematic. However, when reading the Judgment, 
a striking observation is how little difficulty the Tribunal actually felt it 
faced. It is fair to believe that this can probably be attributed to the fact that 
the acts of Nazi Germany would, in the eyes of the Tribunal, amount to 
aggression no matter what an actual definition would look like. As a result, 
the brutality of the offences made it possible for the Tribunal to elude the 
issue of an actual definition. The Judgment revealed the Tribunals state of 
                                                 
53 Ibid, pp. 220-221. 
54 Ibid, p. 221. 
55 Ibid, p. 186. 
56 Ibid, pp. 203-214.  
57 Ibid, pp. 192-197, see also p. 301 were the Tribunal stated that the occupation of Austria 
and the Sudetenland did not amount to wars of aggression. 
58 History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and the Development of the Law 
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German action. ‘Invasion’ was used with regard to Austria; Denmark, Norway, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg; ‘seizure’ with regard to Czechoslovakia; ‘aggression’ in 
terms of Poland, Yugoslavia and Greece; ‘aggressive war’ regarding the Soviet Union and 
‘war’ with reference to the United States. The difference is said to derive from technical 
and legal aspects and especially the amount of armed resistance encountered and whether 
the States technically were at war or not. 
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mind, as pointed out by Yoram Dinstein when discussing the criticism that 
the illegality of war inevitably leads to criminality59: 
‘War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to 
the belligerent States alone, but effect the whole world. To initiate a 
war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is 
the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes 
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.’60
With the far-reaching Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter, it would probably 
have been possible to hold ordinary combatants and maybe even citizens 
responsible for the crimes committed. However, the judges of the Tribunal 
apparently found that the circle of responsible persons had to be restricted to 
those at a policy-making level. It was concluded that ‘Hitler could not make 
aggressive war by himself. He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, 
military leaders, diplomats and business men’.61 Subsequently, the circle of 
persons tried at Nuremberg was drawn rather loosely from around the head 
of State. Of the 24 defendants charged at Nuremberg, one committed suicide 
and one was declared unfit to stand trial. Of the 22 that were tried, 19 were 
convicted (12 guilty of the crime of aggression), 12 were sentenced to death 
(7 guilty of the crime of aggression) and three defendants were acquitted.62 
As Benjamin B. Ferencz has pointed out, all of the defendants that received 
death sentences on counts of the crime of aggression were closely linked to 
Hitler as either confidants or sitting on high military or diplomatic posts and 
were all well aware of the aggressive intentions of the head of State.63
 Following the Nuremberg Tribunal, an International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East was created for the trial and punishment of the Japanese 
Major War Criminals. Its Charter, approved on 19 January 1946, was very 
similar to the Nuremberg Charter.64 Article 5(a) included a similar provision 
on individual criminal responsibility for crimes against peace. To avoid 
arguments of whether Japan had technically been at war, the words 
‘declared or undeclared’ were incorporated before ‘war of aggression’. 
During trials at Tokyo, the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poene sine lege 
was again brought to the front. The majority upheld the individual criminal 
responsibility for the involvement in acts related to a war of aggression, but 
the question produced dissenting opinions from two judges.65
                                                 
59 Dinstein, Yoram, War, Aggression and Self-defence, p. 120. 
60 ‘Trial of the Major War Criminals, Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences’, reprinted in 41 AJIL (1947) p. 186. 
61 Ibid, p. 223. 
62 Ibid, pp. 272-333. 
63 Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘The Crime of Aggression’ in Kirk McDonald, Gabrielle and 
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64 ‘Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East’, reprinted in Ferencz, 
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65 In re Hirota and Others (International Military Tribunal for the Far East), 15 AD (1948), 
pp. 356-376, Justice Röling of the Netherlands denied that war of aggression existed as a 
crime under international law, pp. 374-375;Justice Pal of India also rejected the idea of the 
criminality of a war of aggression. He argued that individuals acting as agents of State incur 
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 In connection with the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Allies also decided to 
enact Control Council Law No. 10.66 It enabled each occupying authority in 
Germany to prosecute individuals within their zone of occupation for the 
same crimes that were tried by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Regarding crimes 
against peace, Article 2(a) added ‘initiation of invasions’ and pointed out 
that the list was not exhaustive. The trials of I.G. Farben67, High 
Command68, and Ministries69 reiterated the idea that only individuals at the 
policy-making level with a real influence over national policy could be held 
responsible for crimes against peace, including the crime of aggression. In 
the Ministries trial, it was also explained that German conduct towards 
Austria and Czechoslovakia were to be seen as ‘initiation of invasions’ 
according to Control Council Law No. 10 and therefore punishable as 
crimes against peace per se70. 
 In conclusion, the case law following from some of the heinous acts 
committed during World War II set a precedent of allowing for individual 
criminal responsibility in connection to acts or wars of aggression. At that 
time in history, such crimes were called crimes against peace; today, the 
crime of aggression has replaced the former notion. 
2.3 Aggression and the United Nations 
As noted previously, the establishment of the United Nations with the 
adoption of the UN Charter resulted in the prohibition of the use of force, 
and a world where the Security Council was given an important role in 
dealing with acts of aggression. In addition to examining the role of the 
Security Council, this chapter will also present the relationship other UN-
organs, such as the General Assembly, the ICJ and the ILC, have to 
aggression. 
2.3.1 The Security Council 
Before examining how the Security Council has dealt with situations of 
aggression it is necessary to describe its role and functions within the UN-
system. Article 24(1) of the UN Charter provides that the Security Council 
‘has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security’. It has been argued that the role of the Security Council in 
determining acts of aggression is just that, a primary one, and not an 
exclusive one. This idea has characterised parts of the work on the crime of 
aggression ever since the establishment of the UN Charter, and continues to 
do so. This will be discussed further throughout this thesis. 
                                                                                                                            
no criminal responsibility in international law for such acts, p. 375-376; see also Rifaat, 
Ahmed M., International Aggression: A Study of the Legal Concept – Its Development and 
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67 In re Krauch and Others (I.G. Farben Trial), 15 AD (1948), pp. 669-671. 
68 In re von Leeb and Others (High Command Trial), 15 AD (1948), pp. 379-383. 
69 In re von Weizsaecker and Others (Ministries Trial), 16 AD (1949), pp. 348-349. 
70 Ibid, pp. 347-348. 
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 Article 39 stipulates that the Council ‘shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression’. It is 
further authorised to make recommendations or decide what measures 
should be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42. The measures taken may or may not 
include the use of force. As previously noted, the only exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4), besides action authorised by 
the Security Council, is a States right to use individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with Article 51. 
 Yoram Dinstein has explained that the scope of discretion given to the 
Security Council, in discharging its duties, is considerable. Unlike in the 
case of a State claiming to practise their right to self-defence, there is no 
need for an ‘armed attack’ to occur. A determination of a threat to the peace, 
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression is sufficient to take action. In 
the Dinsteins view, the authority given to the Council can be seen as a ‘carte 
blanche’ in determining whether and how to use force, as well as when and 
against whom. As an example, the Council has the power to instigate a 
preventive war to deter an anticipated future breach of the peace.71 In 
addition, it can be hard to separate between the categories of a breach of the 
peace and an act of aggression. Neither the UN Charter nor the practice of 
the Council gives any clear guidance on how to do this. However, what 
category the Council produces for acting in a particular situation is not of 
great relevance to it as it has the right to act as long as one of the categories 
in Article 39 is at hand.72
 It must also be kept in mind that the Security Council is a political and 
not a judicial organ. Its member States make politically motivated decisions 
that might not always correspond with legal considerations. Being a non-
judicial body, the Council is not required to clarify the reasons for its 
decisions. Nevertheless, when it decides that one of the categories of Article 
39 is at hand, the decision is conclusive and binding for all States Parties to 
the UN Charter in accordance with Article 25. 
 Finally, Article 27(3) declares that a decision of the Security Council 
requires the affirmative vote of at least nine of its fifteen members. 
Moreover, for a decision to pass it needs the concurring votes of the five 
permanent members of the Council, China, France, Russia73, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. This procedure is what is usually referred to 
as the ‘veto power’ of the permanent members. This means that a negative 
vote by a permanent member will block a decision, even if fourteen of the 
fifteen members are supportive. If a permanent member is involved, directly 
or indirectly, in a situation on which the Council is to make a decision under 
Chapter VII, they are not abstained from voting. Consequently, the Councils 
action in a situation involving one of the permanent members is practically 
beyond the reach of the collective security system established by the UN 
Charter.  
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 The establishment of the UN-system of collective security has 
unfortunately not signalled the end of unilateral resort to force or existence 
of wars. During the last 60 years, numerous, seemingly clear, cases of acts 
of aggression have occurred around the Globe. However, the Security 
Council has been hesitant to brand specific situations as acts of aggression 
in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter.74 On a few occasions, the 
Security Council has characterised acts by Israel75, South Africa76 and 
Southern Rhodesia77, today known as Zimbabwe, as acts of aggression. 
Nevertheless, the mere characterisation is not the same as a formal 
determination under Article 39 to that effect. While Matthias Schuster 
claims that such a formal determination has never been made78, Giorgio 
Gaja points to Security Council Resolution 387, covering South African 
aggression against Angola, as the sole case.79 In any case, the Security 
Council is evidently reluctant to make formal determinations that a situation 
amounts to an act of aggression. 
 The reluctance to determine situations as acts of aggression can be 
described by looking at cases where the notion was not used. In 1990, Iraq 
invaded and attempted to annex Kuwait. Mark S. Stein describes this event 
as ‘surely the most flagrant act of aggression in the post-World War II 
era’.80 Yet Iraqi action was not branded as an act of aggression. In Security 
Council Resolution 660, ‘a breach of international peace and security’ was 
opted for.81 Only when Iraq decided to close foreign embassies in Kuwait 
did the Council pass a Resolution condemning ‘aggressive acts…against the 
diplomatic premises and personnel’.82 Other examples of incidents not 
amounting to acts of aggression according to the Council include the Korean 
War, the Falkland War and the Iran-Iraq War; all branded a breach of 
peace.83 Adding to this, the veto of the permanent members means that no 
case involving one of them has been labelled as acts of aggression. 
 In the cases of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the 
Security Council as an alternative opted for the establishment of ad hoc 
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Tribunals to try individuals for their involvement in the heinous acts 
occurring in the respective conflicts. Acting under chapter VII of the UN 
Charter the Tribunals were set up pursuant to the Council’s power to decide 
measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
In 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), and in 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
were established.84 The ICTY was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of laws and 
customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated 
in the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.85 For the ICTR subject-
matter jurisdiction was given for genocide, crimes against humanity and 
violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of the 
Second Additional Protocol, allegedly perpetrated in Rwanda between 1 
January and 31 December 1994.86 Since the crime of aggression was left 
outside the scope of the ad hoc Tribunals, interest in them is limited to 
individual criminal responsibility in general and the fact that the formation 
of an ad hoc Tribunal is an additional alternative for the Security Council 
when taking action. 
 In conclusion, it appears as if the Security Council has an established 
practice of not branding clear-cut cases of aggression as such. This can 
partly be described by the organisation of the Council as established by the 
UN Charter. The veto power enables the permanent members to avoid being 
labelled as aggressors. Additionally, other States may from time to time 
surely benefit from a friendly veto in their favour by one of their ‘friends’ 
amongst the permanent members. It is not necessary for the Council to 
decide that an act of aggression has occurred for it to embark on 
enforcement measures. According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, a 
particular situation can just as easily be called a breach of or a threat to the 
peace for it to have all the enforcement measures of Chapter VII available. 
Therefore, the Security Council may prefer, for political or other reasons, to 
use a more imprecise term as breach of the peace. The fact that the Council 
is a political and not a judicial body obviously comes into play. This issue 
will be revisited when discussing the relationship between the Council and 
the ICC. Finally, it should be observed that with the establishment of the ad 
hoc Tribunals the Council, if nothing else, indicates that it understands the 
importance of international criminal responsibility as a useful tool for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 However, the Security Council is not the only UN-organ to have dealt 
with cases of aggression. As will be shown, both the General Assembly and 
the International Court of Justice have considered acts of aggression 
contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
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2.3.2 The General Assembly 
The powers of the General Assembly are contained in Articles 10 to 14 of 
the UN Charter. In short, the Assembly may discuss any question within the 
scope of the UN Charter and may consider the general principles of co-
operation in the maintenance of international peace and security. The 
Assembly may also make recommendations to member States or the 
Security Council or both, on the condition that the Council is not dealing 
with the matter in question. Additionally, matters concerning international 
peace and security requiring action must be referred to the Council. Despite 
the vaguely outlined powers prescribed to it, the General Assembly has 
considered questions involving aggression. 
 When North Korean forces invaded South Korean territory without 
warning in 1950, the Security Council was able to pass Resolutions 
condemning the action and calling for the assistance of member States.87 
These Resolutions were adopted while the Soviet Union was boycotting the 
Council due to a disagreement on who should occupy the ‘Chinese’ seat at 
the Council.88 Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union returned and made use of 
its veto right, blocking the Council’s work. The General Assembly acted 
swiftly and adopted the ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ on 3 November 
1950.89 It maintained that the Council had the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, but in case of paralysis in 
the Council, the factual competence to make recommendations was 
transferred to the Assembly. On 1 February 1951, a Resolution was passed 
concluding that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression 
in Korea ‘by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already 
committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against 
United Nations forces there’.90 The ICJ later approved the secondary 
responsibility of the General Assembly, elaborated in the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution, in an advisory opinion.91
 During this period of time, more than one UN-organ was dealing with 
conduct of States that could potentially amount to acts of aggression. Yet, a 
generally acceptable definition of which acts actually amounted to 
aggression was lacking. As a result, work by the ILC on a Draft Code of 
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind had stalled and it was 
apparent that a Resolution clarifying the concept was desirable.92 A Special 
Committee was created to commence work on finding a definition, but work 
progressed slowly. Finally, consensus was reached and on 14 December 
1974, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 on a definition of 
aggression.93 The Resolution had as its main purpose to formulate 
guidelines for the Security Council to follow when determining whether an 
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act of aggression had occurred according to Article 39 of the UN Charter. 
The aim of a more concise definition was to simplify this determination and 
deter potential aggressors. Eight substantive Articles were included and in 
the Preamble the role of the Security Council was recalled, and it was 
observed that ‘aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the 
illegal use of force’.94
 The achievements of Resolution 3314 and its definition of aggression 
have produced different views in the literature. While some give their 
approval95, others seem rather critical of it.96 More than twenty years of 
discussion with States giving their distinct views on aggression preceded the 
final product that was Resolution 3314. It has been pointed out that in order 
to achieve a consensus in adopting the Resolution, several confusing phrases 
made it into the final product.97 A brief look into its substantive Articles 
will be presented, seeing as the discussion surrounding Resolution 3314 and 
its possible ambiguities may be of interest for the concept of aggression as a 
crime entailing individual criminal responsibility. 
 When trying to produce a definition of aggression there are generally 
three schools of thought: a generic, a specific and a mixed approach. The 
generic approach broadly defines the offence leaving a great deal of space of 
interpretation of what acts to include. The specific approach contains an 
exhaustive list of acts amounting to aggression. A mixed approach seeks to 
combine ‘the best of both worlds’ by combining a generic definition with an 
illustrative list of acts to help understand the general clause.98 Resolution 
3314 appears to use a form of mixed approach by combining a generic 
definition in Article 1 with a list of acts in Article 3. Article 1 states that 
‘Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State’.99 The added 
list of acts in Article 3 includes invasion, attack, bombardment, blockade 
and sending of armed bands or mercenaries to attack another State. Seeing 
as Article 4 explained that the Security Council could determine that other 
acts amounted to aggression, the list in Article 3 was not intended to be 
exhaustive. 
 Furthermore, Article 5(2) stipulating that ‘A war of aggression is a 
crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility’ has received much attention.100 The drafters seem to have 
differentiated between a ‘war of aggression’, which is a crime against 
international peace, and ‘aggression’ which gives rise to international 
responsibility. However, the definition does not give any hints on where the 
separation line between the two notions lies, or what should happen in case 
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of a breach of either of them.101 In addition, the definition is silent on 
whether it is a State or an individual who commits the ‘crime’ and whether 
‘international responsibility’ relates to a State or an individual. It has been 
suggested that the definition generally aimed at defining the crime of 
aggression and the following individual criminal responsibility.102 Another 
view is presented by Yoram Dinstein, interpreting Resolution 3314 to be 
understood to only include acts amounting to a war of aggression in 
connection with individual criminal responsibility, and that acts ‘short of 
war’ would fall outside of that regime.103
 Nevertheless, the applicability of Resolution 3314 to individuals 
remains unclear. As the purpose of the definition was to function as a 
guideline for the Security Council, its significance to individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression can be questioned. A 
consideration of aggression by the Security Council for political purposes 
might not look the same as one by a judicial organ for individual criminal 
responsibility.104 It has also been observed that the definition lacks a mental, 
subjective, element, leaving the question of whether it meant to establish 
individual criminal responsibility even more dubious.105
 Despite the criticism voiced for its vagueness, Resolution 3314 might 
still prove to have been a useful contribution to the development of 
international law. As it was at the time, the development of the crime of 
aggression, individual criminal responsibility and a permanent international 
criminal court had been put to a halt before a definition of aggression could 
be reached. Without a compromise that resulted in the inclusion of a couple 
of vague Articles, a consensus definition would probably never have been 
reached. With the adoption of Resolution 3314, work on these intriguing 
and important areas of international law could yet again progress. Since the 
definition of aggression took the form of a UN General Assembly 
Resolution, it did not have legally binding force as such. Its legal input must 
therefore instead be sought in the role it played for the work mentioned and 
its possible influence on customary international law. 
 In conclusion, it is fair to state that the General Assembly has been 
involved with different aspects of aggression. In fact, in addition to the 
Korea crisis previously mentioned, the General Assembly has adopted 
Resolutions concerning acts of aggression in situations involving Namibia, 
South Africa, the Middle East and Bosnia Herzegovina. In some of the 
cases, the General Assembly declared that State conduct amounted to an act 
of aggression as spelt out in Resolution 3314.106
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2.3.3 The International Court of Justice 
According to Article 92 of the UN Charter, the ICJ is the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations. It may give advisory opinions upon requests 
from the General Assembly, the Security Council or other UN-organs and 
specialized agencies authorised to do so concerning legal questions pursuant 
to Article 96 of the UN Charter. In addition, legal disputes between States 
can also fall within the realm of the Court if a case is referred to it in 
accordance with Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.107
 The case law of the ICJ reveals that it has considered issues relating to 
aggression in several cases. In its advisory opinion in the Certain Expenses 
case, the ICJ considered the respective functions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council under the UN Charter with respect to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. It held that the role 
prescribed to the Council under Article 24 was ‘primary, not exclusive’.108 
The Court further explained that only when the Council is taking action in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter do they have an exclusive 
right, and only in those cases must the Assembly refer the question to the 
Council.109
 In its 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ considered alleged 
support by the United States to the contras and established a breach of the 
‘obligation under customary international law not to use force against 
another State’.110 The obligation under customary international law not to 
use force was described to encompass practically the same as the prohibition 
on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.111 The ICJ also 
examined if United States action could be justified under the right to self-
defence, and therefore if Nicaragua had engaged in an ‘armed attack’ as 
stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter or the corresponding customary 
international law rule. General Assembly Resolution 3314 was used as a 
tool to determine what acts amounted to an armed attack, and it was held 
that its description in Article 3(g) of the sending by a State of armed bands 
to carry out acts of armed force in another State reflected customary 
international law.112 According to Mark S. Stein, the ICJ did not determine 
that the United States had committed an act of aggression. As a distinction 
was made with armed attack and aggression on one side and the use of force 
on the latter, the ICJ simply attributed the latter to the United States.113
 During the jurisdiction and admissibility-phase, the United States had 
raised arguments questioning the competence of the ICJ to examine a 
situation that was being dealt with by the Security Council. The ICJ 
recognised the primary responsibility of the Council in accordance with 
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Article 24 of the UN Charter, but with reference to its own case law in the 
Hostages case stated that it was not one of exclusivity. Unlike the 
relationship between the Council and the General Assembly, there existed 
no clear demarcation between the Council and the ICJ. In describing the 
different functions of the organs, the ICJ stated that ‘The Council has 
functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercises 
purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate 
but complementary functions with respect to the same events’.114 
Furthermore, it was clarified that proceedings in the ICJ was not 
objectionable as being in effect an appeal of a Security Council decision. As 
the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ could pass 
judgment on certain legal aspects of a situation which had also been 
considered by the Council.115
 The practice of the ICJ, as well as the General Assembly, reveals that 
the Security Council is not the only UN-organ to have dealt with acts of 
aggression. The role of the Council as the sole actor in determining if an act 
of aggression has occurred is seemingly questioned by the practice of the 
ICJ and the Assembly. The case law of the ICJ shows that there is a 
possibility for a judicial organ to try to solve legal questions in a case 
involving acts of aggression. The role that the Security Council plays in the 
same case is one where the functions performed are of a political nature. 
The potential exclusivity of the Council to determine if an act of aggression 
has occurred is apparently limited to measures taken in accordance with 
chapter VII of the UN Charter. Even though the ICJ is concerned with 
States or UN-organs and not individuals, its position as judicial organ in 
relation to the Security Council is still very interesting to note. 
Consequently, the possibility of a court to work alongside the Council, to 
exercise purely judicial functions in cases of acts of aggression should be 
kept in mind. In fact, the role that a court plays in trying to solve a situation 
of acts of aggression can be instrumental to try to find a peaceful settlement. 
2.3.4 The International Law Commission 
In 1947, the General Assembly established the ILC by Resolution 
174(II).116 At the same session, the ILC was given the task of formulating 
the principles of international law recognised by the Nuremberg Charter and 
Judgment and to prepare a Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind.117 The ILC produced a formulation of the principles in 
1950, principle VI(a) reciting the definition of crimes against peace from the 
Nuremberg Charter.118 Work on a Draft Code of Offences continued within 
the ILC, and the first phase of this work was completed with a 1954 
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Draft.119 Article 1 followed in the footsteps of Nuremberg by prescribing 
individual criminal responsibility and Article 2 contained a list of acts 
deemed ‘offences against the peace and security of mankind’.120 Of the 
thirteen main offences included, the first nine, directly or indirectly, were 
concerned with aggression.121 In its commentary to the Article, the ILC 
explained that no attempt was made to enumerate such acts exhaustively and 
that aggression could arise out of other acts referred to in other paragraphs 
of the Article.122
 In comparison to the Nuremberg Charter, the 1954 Draft used another 
way of regulating the crime of aggression. The Nuremberg Charter applied a 
short rather generic approach, with much to the discretion of the judges to 
decide on acts to be included, limited to a ‘war of aggression’. Instead, the 
1954 Draft utilised a comprehensive list of acts constituting aggression and 
still left the door open to the possibility of other acts amounting to 
aggression. In addition followed in the line of the UN Charter by using the 
terms of ‘aggression’ and ‘use of force’ to describe the offences. The 1954 
Draft even went as far as to include threats of aggression and indirect 
aggression such as participation in civil strife, backing of terrorism and 
breach of disarmament treaties. In general, the 1954 Draft was an ambitious 
effort, but it failed to meet the approval of the UN member States. The lack 
of a generally accepted definition of aggression in international law at that 
time resulted in that a final decision on the 1954 Draft was not possible.123 
Standing at the outset of a Cold War, political reality at that time were to 
block the 1954 Draft for two decades and leave it dormant. 
 With the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3314, a definition of 
aggression was in place, and the Assembly invited the ILC to resume its 
work on a Draft Code in 1981.124 The ILC decided to focus on individual 
criminal responsibility for the crimes to be included, leaving aside the 
question of the possible criminal responsibility of States to a later stage.125
 In 1991, the ILC adopted its Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind.126 Article 3 established the individual criminal 
responsibility by stating that ‘An individual who commits a crime against 
the peace and security of mankind is responsible thereof and is liable to 
punishment’.127 Article 5 was included to clarify that the individual criminal 
responsibility was something distinct and without prejudice to potential 
State responsibility for the same acts. Even though an individual acting as 
an ‘agent of the State’ could commit the acts included, it did not mean that 
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the 1991 Draft sought to apply international criminal responsibility to 
States. The ILC only pointed out that the same act could encompass both 
individual criminal responsibility and State responsibility.128 A definition of 
aggression was included in Article 15, establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression. Resembling Resolution 3314, the 
1991 Draft, used a general clause combined with an illustrative list of acts, 
almost literally the same as the one used in the former. Since the 1991 Draft 
was concerned with individuals, unlike Resolution 3314, it added a 
paragraph clarifying that potential perpetrators of the crime were to be 
sought at the policy-making level.129 Following its previous 1954 Draft, the 
ILC decided to include threats of aggression in Article 16 and several forms 
of indirect aggression, under the heading of ‘intervention’, in Article 17. 
 The 1991 Draft was transmitted to governments around the world for 
comments and observations.130 Five years later, after assessing the opinions 
presented by some governments, the ILC adopted its 1996 Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.131 Like the 1991 Draft, 
the 1996 Draft made it clear in Article 2 that it dealt with individual 
criminal responsibility and in Article 4 that it did not prejudice the question 
of State responsibility. However, a different approach was used in defining 
the crime of aggression in Article 16: 
‘An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or 
orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression 
committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression.’132
The ILC explained that the Article was drawn from the Nuremberg Charter 
and that ‘leader or organizer’ referred to the same individuals at the highest 
policy-making level as the Nuremberg Tribunal had discussed. The ILC 
further explained that the violation of international law rules governing the 
use of force by a State was a sine qua non-condition for the possibility of 
the crime of aggression to arise. In fact, they noted that a sufficiently serious 
violation of the prohibition contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter was 
required.133
 The 1996 Draft and its approach to the crime of aggression appears to 
have been influenced by the views expressed on its 1991 Draft. Despite the 
overall resemblance between the two, there is a striking difference in 
regards to the definition of aggression. The trend in the years before with the 
1954 Draft, Resolution 3314 and the 1991 Draft had leaned towards some 
form of mixed approach where a generic definition was combined with list 
of acts. The 1996 Draft stepped away from this and included a generic rather 
vague approach, with more resemblance to the definition in the Nuremberg 
Charter. On discussing the fact that some of the crimes that were included in 
the 1991 Draft were excluded in the 1996 Draft, the ILC concluded that it 
was necessary for reaching consensus and obtaining the support of 
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governments.134 Presumably, the same holds true for the change in the 
approach to the crime of aggression. It might well be that some governments 
felt the need to change a long explanatory definition into a short vague one. 
At least, one can assume that it is likely that States acted this way under the 
belief that it would suit their interest. While it is not certain that a short 
generic approach could not include more or less the same acts as one 
combined with a list of acts, it leaves more room for interpretation. States 
might have been of the belief that this would suit them when exercising their 
sovereign rights, claiming that certain acts cannot be interpreted to be 
included in the crime of aggression. 
2.4 Customary International Law 
Before turning our attention to the ICC, a brief note on the status of 
aggression in customary international law will be given. First, one should 
note that the work conducted on the crime of aggression in relation to the 
ICC probably influences the opinion on the status of customary international 
law on the issue. However, this chapter will briefly examine the status of the 
crime of aggression in customary international law outside the scope of that 
work, and is a complement to the latter. 
 As shown by the discussion above, the idea that acts of aggression and 
the intrinsically linked crime of aggression is prohibited finds support in the 
development of international law and its various legal sources. Rightfully, 
concerns were raised when the Nuremberg Tribunal pronounced that the 
Nuremberg Charter, in their view, reflected existing international law at the 
time and that it in itself contributed to the development of international 
law.135 Doubts as to whether the crime of aggression was recognised in 
international law at the time seem legitimate and necessary. As Yoram 
Dinstein simply puts it, the provision in the Nuremberg Charter relating to 
the crime of aggression ‘was not really declaratory of pre-existing 
customary international law’.136 However, these doubts certainly must have 
vanished during the last 50 years. For today there seems to be a general 
opinion that aggression has the status of an international crime.137 Irina 
Kaye Müller-Schieke explains that the Nuremberg Tribunal either enforced 
existing customary international law or embodied the first act in establishing 
a new custom. She continues by recalling the opening speech by Mr Justice 
Jackson, the American Chief Prosecutor, in which he stated ‘every custom 
has its origin in some single act and every agreement has to be initiated by 
the action of some State’.138 It seems as if the latter of the alternatives 
presented by Müller-Scheike is the most feasible one, as it has to be highly 
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questioned if a customary international law rule providing for the crime of 
aggression existed prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
 However, since the Nuremberg, Tokyo and related post-war trials not a 
single case of prosecution based on aggression entailing individuals has 
taken place. This might easily lead one to the assumption that aggression no 
longer constitutes an international crime entailing individual criminal 
responsibility. Constantine Antonopoulos challenges this assumption by 
explaining that the crime of aggression has not been refuted in State 
practice. He continues by comparing the situation to that of genocide. 
Despite the existence of the Genocide Convention since 1948139, it was not 
until the creation of ICTY and ICTR that the crime of genocide was 
prosecuted. Thus, a lengthy lack of prosecution does not necessarily mean 
that the crime of aggression cannot be pursued as a crime entailing 
individual criminal responsibility.140
 Supporting the argument in result, one might feel that it is necessary to 
make a distinction between treaty-law and customary international law. The 
crime of genocide has been codified in the mentioned Convention and finds 
its support for prosecution in treaty-law. The crime of aggression, on the 
other hand, lacks a binding definition and must find its support for 
prosecution in customary international law, and can only persevere within 
its realm. Since customary international law is created by custom, it must 
also be possible to change or even terminate it by custom. Thus, if constant 
State practice, supported by opinio juris, were to show that the crime of 
aggression no longer holds this stature, then individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression would cease to exist. However, the 
crime of aggression cannot be said to have suffered this fate. The fact that 
no individual has been prosecuted for the crime of aggression since the end 
of World War II is not due to absence of opinio juris on the matter. 
Constantine Antonopoulos explains the lacking codification by problems of 
finding a feasible solution as to the definition of the crime, and the fact that 
action by the Security Council or regional organizations can be another way 
of dealing with a situation.141 Yoram Dinstein summarises it in a good way 
by stating that ‘The criminality of war of aggression means the 
accountability of human beings, not merely abstract entities’.142
 Having reached the conclusion that the crime of aggression could very 
well exist in customary international law, the next hurdle to climb is trying 
to find out what it in fact encompasses. As to this question, it has to be 
admitted that some question marks continue to linger on. The wide notion of 
‘crimes against peace’, used in the Nuremberg Charter, seems to have 
become obsolete and has instead been replaced with the narrower notion of 
‘the crime of aggression’. However, what acts can be said to be included in 
the latter notion? 
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 Some legal sources seem to assert the view that only acts amounting to 
a ‘war of aggression’ can be included in the crime. The Nuremberg Charter, 
the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and the General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 all touch on this notion. In addition, different approaches 
have been used to come up with a definition of an act of aggression and 
consequently the crime of aggression. The definition has been constructed 
both in generic terms and by listing specific acts amounting to aggression. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that at least some parts of Resolution 
3314, using a form of mixed approach to define acts amounting to 
aggression, was declaratory of existing customary international law.143 Even 
though Resolution 3314 is concerned with the conduct of a States, i.e. acts 
of aggression, it might still be of interest for the crime of aggression and 
individual criminal responsibility. As explained by the ILC in connection 
with its 1996 Draft, an act of aggression is required for the crime of 
aggression to arise. Hence, it is necessary to know when an act of 
aggression has been committed in order to know when a possible crime of 
aggression might exist. Furthermore, it seems fair to believe that the crime 
of aggression is a leadership crime, i.e. only individuals at the highest 
policy-making level can be perpetrators. This idea was introduced by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and has been upheld in the work of the ILC. 
 It seems that the various legal resources do not present a unified picture 
of what acts can be said to constitute the crime of aggression. This is partly 
due to the fact that different terminology has been used when discussing the 
issue, and partly it is due to the fact that most of the time expression has 
been made on State responsibility and acts of aggression, rather than 
individual criminal responsibility and the crime of aggression. It seems 
appropriate to settle for that the crime of aggression do seem to exist in 
customary international law at this stage. It is also useful to note that there 
are strong indicators that an act of aggression by a State is required for the 
crime of aggression to arise and that it is limited to individuals at the highest 
policy-making level. However, exactly what acts it encompasses and how 
they are to be defined still needs some elaboration. 
 In conclusion, customary international law probably involves the 
concept of the crime of aggression and individual criminal responsibility for 
it. What needs to be resolved is exactly what acts can be said to be included 
in a definition of the crime. 
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3 The International Criminal 
Court 
Between 15 June and 17 July 1998, representatives from 160 States attended 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome (Rome 
Conference).144 On the final day of the Conference, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) was adopted and opened for 
signature.145 Article 5 deals with the crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court: 
‘1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The 
Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to 
the following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; 
(d) The crime of aggression. 
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations.’146
The crime of aggression is obviously included in the Rome Statute, but 
unlike the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it lacks a 
provision setting out its content. This chapter will examine the discussion 
and the work carried out on the crime of aggression prior to, in direct 
relation to and subsequent to the Rome Conference. It will proceed by 
examining different proposals brought forward in relation to the crime of 
aggression. The main focus will be on the most recent work, i.e. the work 
conducted subsequent to the Rome Conference, as this period has not been 
sufficiently covered nor summarised in the present debate. The aim of this 
chapter is to point out the main obstacles encountered in the work of trying 
to find a feasible provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in the 
Rome Statute. A future Review Conference will be kept in mind throughout, 
to arrive at in what direction the work is currently heading. 
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3.1 The First Steps Towards an ICC 
The Rome Conference and the adoption of the Rome Statute was the 
culmination of a process that had started more than 50 years earlier. In the 
late 1940s, the establishment of an international criminal court was one of 
three major human rights projects within the realm of the General 
Assembly. The other two being a universal declaration on human rights and 
a convention to prevent genocide, both rapidly adopted in 1948. The 
General Assembly and the ILC made initial efforts to establish an 
international criminal court in the late 1940s and in the 1950s. However, the 
work was put on hold pending the adoption of a generally accepted 
definition of aggression, eventually achieved in General Assembly 
Resolution 3314, and then faced further postponement.147
 In 1989, the General Assembly revived the project by requesting the 
ILC to resume work on an international criminal court.148 A Draft Statute 
was presented by the ILC in 1994.149 Article 20(b) stipulated that a future 
court would have jurisdiction over ‘the crime of aggression’. The ILC 
explained that the inclusion of the crime of aggression was problematic 
since it, unlike genocide, lacked a treaty definition. Nevertheless, it argued 
that not to include the crime of aggression would be a retrogressive step, 
and that a contemporary court would be in a better position to define the 
customary international law crime of aggression than the Nuremberg 
Tribunal had been. Doubts as to what acts would amount to the crime of 
aggression, some members of the ILC claiming that the crime was limited to 
waging a war of aggression, resulted in that the crime remained undefined in 
the 1994 Draft Statute.150
 Furthermore, certain safeguards concerning the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the crime were included to recognise the special responsibilities of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ILC explained 
that the crime of aggression presupposed an act of aggression by a State and 
that it was for the Council to make such decisions on States. Therefore, 
Article 23(2) stated that a prior determination by the Security Council that 
an act of aggression had occurred was required for ‘a complaint of or 
directly related to an act of aggression’ to be brought under the Statute. The 
future court would then be allowed to make a decision on the involvement 
of a specific individual in the planning and waging of aggression.151
 An Ad Hoc Committee was established by the General Assembly whose 
role was to discuss the issues emerging from the Draft Statute.152 In its Final 
Report, the Ad Hoc Committee summarised comments by the participating 
delegations on the inclusion of the crime of aggression under the jurisdiction 
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of an international criminal court. The supporters of an inclusion stressed 
the importance of continuity in prohibiting the use of force and warned 
about the danger of taking retrogressive steps, whilst the opposition focused 
on definitional difficulties and the role of the Security Council amongst 
other things.153
 Following in the line of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General Assembly 
went on to establish a Preparatory Committee to review the ILC Draft 
Statute.154 At its sixth and final session, the Committee completed its work 
of preparing a consolidated text of a Statute for an International Criminal 
Court (1998 Draft Statute) for adoption at the Rome Conference.155 
Christopher K. Hall describes it as considerably longer than the 1994 ILC 
Draft Statute, containing various options submitted by States, but admits 
that the basic structure is similar.156 The crime of aggression is included in 
Article 5(b) as one of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court. The 
inclusion was briefly explained by stating that it ‘reflects the view held by a 
large number of delegations that the crime of aggression should be included 
in the Statute’.157 Especially two questions concerning the crime of 
aggression faced diverging views amongst delegations, namely the 
definition of the crime and the role of the Security Council in the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime by the court. 
 Concerning the definition of the crime, three different options were 
included in the 1998 Draft Statute. The first option provided for a generic 
approach to the definition. From the wording of the first option, it followed 
that the question of defining certain acts as aggression in reality would be 
left to the Security Council. The second option combined a generic approach 
to the definition with a list of acts possibly amounting to aggression, clearly 
resembling General Assembly Resolution 3314. As the result of informal 
consultations conducted by the German delegation to find a broadly 
supported approach, a third option was produced. It applied a generic 
approach but limited it to the most obvious cases of aggression, where acts 
perpetrated were in manifest contravention of the UN Charter and had ‘the 
object or result of establishing a [military] occupation of, or annexing, the 
territory of such other State or part thereof by armed forces of the attacking 
State’.158 Due to diverging views amongst delegations, all three different 
proposals were submitted to the Rome Conference for consideration.159
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 The role of the Security Council in the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
crime by the court was dealt with in Article 10 of the 1998 Draft Statute. 
Article 10(4) presented two options on the issue. The first option permitted 
both a positive and a negative determination by the Council. Under the 
version of positive determination, the Council would have to determine that 
an act of aggression had occurred as a prerequisite for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction. Negative determination would require the Council to determine 
that an act of aggression has not occurred in order to block the court from 
exercising jurisdiction. Evidently the two versions of the first option would 
produce different outcomes if put into play. A positive determination would 
enable permanent members of the Council to cast a veto, resulting in 
interference with the jurisdiction of the court. It is not far-fetched to believe 
that this right might be abused in the interest of politics. A negative 
determination would only allow permanent members to permit jurisdiction 
contrary to the votes of the other members of the Council, but not obstruct 
it. Under the second option of Article 10 (4), it was simply put that a 
determination by the Council in accordance with Article 39 of the UN 
Charter ‘shall be binding on the deliberation of the Court in respect of a 
complaint, the subject matter of which is the act of aggression’.160
 Concerning provisions relevant to the crime of aggression, the 1998 
Draft Statute differentiates somewhat from the one produced by the ILC in 
1994. Whereas the 1994 ILC Draft Statute lacked a definition of the crime, 
the 1998 Draft Statute produced a text including three options on how to 
define the crime. Both of the Draft Statutes seem to agree on that the 
Security Council has a role to play in the application of the crime by the 
court. The proposals put forward in the respective Draft Statutes might look 
similar at first glance, but there is one interesting and distinct difference. 
The Preparatory Committee included the possibility that the role of the 
Council could be one of negative determination. This proposal has the 
advantage of not giving too much weight to the veto power of the permanent 
members of the Council, but at the same time not excluding the involvement 
of the Council altogether. Such a solution might appeal to several States, 
with the obvious exception of the permanent members. As will be shown in 
the following parts of this thesis, the negative determination-proposal has 
not been a part of the discussion in recent years, but it should at least be 
noted as an interesting proposal. 
 The work of the ILC and the two Committees constituted the point of 
departure of the Rome Conference. In particular, the 1998 Draft Statute, 
containing 116 Articles, several of which contained more than one option 
and full of square brackets, was an extensive document for the delegations 
at Rome to consider. Even though the questions of a definition and the role 
of the Security Council remained unclear, there existed concrete proposals 
to consider at the Conference. For the definition of the crime there seemed 
to be a choice between a generic or a specific approach, or possibly a 
combination of the two into a mixed one. When considering the role of the 
Security Council, a predominant view was that it should have at least some 
part to play. 
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3.2 The Rome Conference 
The crime of aggression was discussed extensively at the Rome Conference 
and attending States expressed a great variety of positions. Press releases of 
statements made at the Rome Conference showed at least eight different 
positions. Views ranged from those supporting its inclusion to those 
opposing it on the grounds that the ICC ‘should steer clear of political issues 
such as the question of aggression’.161
 The problems encountered at the Conference can be divided into three 
separate, but interrelated, questions concerning the crime of aggression. 
First, divergent views were expressed on whether to include the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute at all. A general objection raised against its 
inclusion was that it was superfluous, since offenders are also likely to be 
guilty of at least one of the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Grant M. Dawson challenges this objection by stating that it ‘does not take 
into account the value of the criminalization of the aggression itself’.162 At 
the Rome Conference, promoters of an inclusion held that to exclude the 
crime would be a retrogressive step, keeping in mind the precedents of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo holding individuals criminally responsible for the 
crime more than 50 years ago. Opposing States, such as the United States 
and China, advanced reasons of national sovereignty and the unresolved role 
of the Security Council as obstacles. Controversial as it may have been at 
the time, the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute 
gathered the support of the majority of the delegations at the Conference.163
 However, the main problem was not that of whether to include the 
crime or not. Not surprisingly, the major problems faced were those of the 
second and third questions; namely what a definition of the crime would 
look like and what role the Security Council should play, if any, in the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime by the ICC. The same questions had 
been discussed extensively in the Preparatory Committee without a solution 
and when they re-emerged at the Rome Conference, diverging views were 
expressed between States supportive of an inclusion and those opposing it as 
well as within the respective groups. 
 Several proposals were put forward in concern to the definition. A 
group of Arab and African States insisted on a wide definition, based on 
General Assembly Resolution 3314, but in some parts formulated to 
encompass a wider range of situations. They suggested that situations 
‘depriving other peoples of their right to self-determination, freedom and 
independence’ and ‘by resorting to armed force to threaten or violate the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of that State or the 
inalienable rights of those people’ were to be included in the definition.164 
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Supporting a wide definition, Cameroon submitted a proposal under which 
any ‘use of armed force…in manifest contravention of the Charter of the 
United Nations’ constituted the crime of aggression.165 States opposing a 
broad definition voiced their concerns that it might lead to politicised 
complaints. They offered their support instead to the approach held by 
Germany at the Preparatory Committee, who continued its work on a 
definition limited to only the most obvious cases of aggression.166 Despite, 
or maybe just because, the fact that several proposals were brought forward 
at the Rome Conference, the delegates were unable to reach a compromise. 
 The question of the role of the Security Council was not as extensively 
discussed at the Conference. Partly this was the result of the fact that the 
question of a definition could not find a solution, and partly because of a 
lack of time. However, when indeed discussed, it remained a controversial 
question amongst delegations in Rome. Several States opposed any role for 
the Council in relation to the crime of aggression, and in some cases any 
reference to it throughout the Statute. Mexico submitted a proposal 
suggesting that ‘the relevant principal organ of the United Nations’ should 
replace all references to the Council in the Statute.167 The permanent 
members of the Council regarded the role it had to play in relation to the 
crime of aggression as a necessary condition for the crime to be included in 
the Statute.168 A proposal by Cameroon suggested that once a crime of 
aggression had been submitted to the court, it would have to refer the matter 
to the Council for a declaration ‘that the aggression does or does not exist’. 
If the Council failed to act within a reasonable time, the court could 
commence an investigation.169 Just like the question of a definition, the 
question of the role of the Security Council could not find a feasible 
compromise at the Rome Conference. 
 With the Conference closing in on its final week and the possibilities of 
finding a compromise looking slim, the Bureau of the Committee of the 
Whole, responsible for organising and coordinating all negotiations, felt that 
it needed to take action. In its Proposal of 10 July, the Bureau proposed that 
delegations should develop a generally acceptable provision by 13 July. In 
case of failure, the crime would be addressed in some other manner, ‘for 
example, by a Protocol or review conference’.170
 This attempt to force a solution on the controversial questions turned 
out to be unsuccessful and was not well received amongst the delegations. 
Opposition was particularly strong amongst Arab and non-aligned States171 
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who had remained committed to the idea of including the crime in the 
Statute throughout the entire Conference. However, realising that a 
compromise on the controversial questions was unlikely to develop before 
the end of the Conference the non-aligned States suggested a new approach. 
In a proposal, they provided for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in 
the Rome Statute, but that the definition of the crime should be elaborated at 
a later stage. Until such a definition was in place, the ICC should not 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime.172
 It was against this background that the Bureau included the compromise 
text consisting of Articles 5(1)(d) and 5(2) in the final text of the Rome 
Statute.173 In the words of Grant M. Dawson, the delegations at the Rome 
Conference ‘agreed to disagree’ to this compromise solution.174 The explicit 
reference to the crime of aggression as a crime within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the ICC is much due to the persistent work of some 
delegations at the Rome Conference, particularly those belonging to the 
non-aligned movement. Even though the final text of the mentioned Articles 
was largely based on the proposal of the non-aligned movement, there is one 
important difference between the two texts. In the final text of the Rome 
Statute, an additional sentence at the end of Article 5(2) was included, 
providing that the definition ‘shall be consistent with the relevant provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations’.175 This phrase has been interpreted as 
a reference to the role the Security Council ‘may or should play in relation 
to this crime’.176
 The result of this political compromise, consisting of Articles 5(1)(d) 
and 5(2), is that the crime of aggression is included de iure but not de facto 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC.177 As stated by Article 5(2), not until an 
amendment ‘defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which 
the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime’ is adopted in 
accordance with Articles 121 and 123 will the ICC be able to exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
 The provisions on the crime of aggression included in the Rome Statute 
need to be interpreted together with the Final Act of the Conference.178 In 
its Resolution F, paragraph 7, a Preparatory Commission was established to 
prepare proposals for a definition of the crime of aggression and the 
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conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. The Commission was to submit 
such proposals for consideration at a future Review Conference, with the 
aim of finding an ‘acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for 
inclusion in this Statute’.179 The immediate establishment of the Preparatory 
Commission, with a mandate to elaborate on the crime of aggression, 
indicates that the discussion on de facto inclusion of the crime was not 
intended to be put on hold. Even though some might brush it aside as part of 
a larger political compromise, its inclusion at least shows an intention of 
keeping unresolved issues on the agenda with a view of finding feasible 
solutions to them. Before turning attention to the work conducted by the 
Preparatory Commission, and its successors, a brief presentation of the 
contents of the Rome Statute, including the process of a Review 
Conference, is called for.180
3.3 The Rome Statute 
First, it might be appropriate to note that the ICC differs from the ad hoc 
Tribunals, ICTY and ICTR, established by the Security Council.181 Whereas 
the former is the result of a multilateral treaty adopted voluntarily at the 
Rome Conference, the latter were created as enforcement measures under 
chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consequently, ICTY and ICTR can be seen 
as courts imposed on States, prescribing cooperation, while the ICC 
functions through the voluntary participation of States to fulfil what they 
have agreed upon in a treaty. 
 In addition, the ad hoc Tribunals were given jurisdiction for 
geographically limited situations taking place within a given time period, 
and was created after the crimes had been committed. The ICC, on the other 
hand, was created to deal with crimes not yet committed. According to 
Article 11(1) of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC ratione 
temporis, is limited to ‘crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute’. For States becoming a Party to the Statute after its entry into force, 
jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed after the Statute has entered into 
force for that State. The Statute required sixty ratifications or accessions to 
enter into force, Article 126(1). Despite the apparent differences amongst 
delegations both prior to and during the Rome Conference, this was 
achieved somewhat rapidly. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court entered into force on 1 July 2002.182 Consequently, the ICC cannot 
exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed prior to this date, or for States 
becoming Parties after the entry into force of the Statute, the date of 
ratification or accession. 
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 As further preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, Article 12 sets 
out the provisions on jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione personae. Article 
12(2)(a) stipulates that the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
the territory of States Parties, regardless of the nationality of the offender. 
According to the Statute, the concept of territory also includes crimes 
committed on board vessels or aircrafts registered in the State Party. The 
ICC also has jurisdiction over nationals of a State Party accused of a crime, 
in accordance with Article 12(2)(b). Finally, the ICC may also exercise 
jurisdiction over territory or nationals of non-Party States if they accept 
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis, in accordance with Article 12(3). This is 
also true if the Security Council refers a situation acting under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, in accordance with Article 13(b). In addition, Article 16 
establishes another role for the Council within the ICC’s regime. It is given 
the opportunity to defer investigations or prosecutions by the ICC if it 
adopts a Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter making a request 
to that effect. The suspension or prevention of such proceedings will be in 
force for a renewable period of 12 months. The adoption of a Security 
Council decision requires a minimum of nine affirmative votes. In theory, 
not even a uniform view by all five permanent members can block ICC 
proceedings, given that there are nine opposing votes from the other ten 
Council members.183 However, in practice it is highly unlikely that such a 
situation will occur. Therefore, with the inclusion of Article 16, the Council 
is in principle given a right to let political decisions prevent prosecution. 
 An important feature of the ICC is that it is based on the principle of 
complementarity whereby the ICC will practice its work as a subsidiary or 
complementary organ to national courts. National courts enjoy the first taste 
of action in exercising jurisdiction, and the ICC may only assert its 
jurisdiction if special circumstances are at hand. The concept of 
complementarity is addressed in paragraph 10 of the Preamble and in 
Article 1, and further described in detail in Articles 17-19 as issues of 
admissibility. In short, these provisions prescribe primacy for the national 
courts unless a situation is referred to the ICC by the Security Council or the 
national organ exercising jurisdiction is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution’, Article 17(1)(a).184
 The reasons for applying a complementarity regime were according to 
Antonio Cassese twofold. First, States considered it practical to avoid the 
ICC from being flooded with cases from all over the world. The ICC, with 
its limited resources, would most likely find such a situation hard to cope 
with. Likewise, national courts would probably have a better chance of 
collecting the necessary evidence and getting hold of the accused. Secondly, 
States raised their concerns on a more principle matter, namely the possible 
infringement on State sovereignty that the ICC would result in.185 The 
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principle of complementarity is a further feature distinguishing the ICC 
from the ICTY and ICTR seeing as the Statutes of the latter Tribunals state 
that they ‘shall have primacy over national courts’.186
 Part three of the Rome Statute, entitled ‘General principles of Criminal 
Law’, is of importance to the work conducted subsequent to the Rome 
Conference and therefore needs a brief explanation here. Articles 22 and 23 
establish that the principle of nulla poene, nullum crime sine lege should 
apply to the Statute. Article 25 lists the different forms of participation in a 
crime that might result in individual criminal responsibility. Such 
participation can for example be in the form of committing the crime as the 
principal perpetrator, ordering the commission of the crime or aiding or 
abetting the commission of the crime. Besides the requirement of fulfilling 
the material element of a crime, an individual naturally needs to fulfil a 
mental element to be held criminally responsible, often referred to as the 
mens rea of the crime. For the purpose of the crimes within the Rome 
Statute, Article 30 stipulates that individual criminal responsibility requires 
that ‘the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge’. Intent 
is described as meaning to engage in the conduct and at least be aware of 
what would be the consequence in the ordinary course of events. Knowledge 
means the awareness of the existence of circumstance or the occurrence of a 
consequence in the ordinary course of events. 
 As has been previously noted, Article 5(2) restricts the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until a provision is adopted in 
accordance with Articles 121 and 123. The content of this is that only after 
the expiry of a period of seven years from the date the Statute entered into 
force, is it possible for a Review Conference to adopt an amendment to the 
Statute, setting out a definition of the crime and rules governing the 
conditions for exercise of jurisdiction over it.187 Thus, no amendment 
concerning the crime of aggression can be entertained until 1 July 2009, i.e. 
seven years after the Rome Statute entered into force. According to Article 
121(5), an amendment will then only enter into force for those States 
deciding to deliver an instrument of ratification or acceptance. It is with this 
future Review Conference in mind that this thesis will proceed to arrive at 
where the work on the crime of aggression needs to be heading and what the 
outlook is of finding a feasible provision in time for the Conference.
 In conclusion, it is reasonable to say that the Rome Statute and the 
establishment of the ICC is a great achievement. For the first time in history, 
a permanent international criminal court is now operative with jurisdiction 
over individuals for ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’. It is encouraging to see that a vast number of States 
have decided to become Parties to this new institution. Nevertheless, the 
question of the crime of aggression turned out to be a highly contentious 
issue, both prior to and at the Rome Conference. In the end, political 
interests assured that the crime had to face a compromise. In order for it to 
be included at all, it was decided that further elaborations on a definition and 
the conditions for exercise of jurisdiction were required. 
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3.4 The Search Continues 
The work conducted on the crime of aggression subsequent to the Rome 
Conference has mainly been that of two different Working Groups. First, the 
Working Group on the crime of aggression, established within the 
Preparatory Commission, considered the question until the Rome Statute 
entered into force. It was succeeded by the Special Working Group on the 
crime of aggression, established by the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, which has been concerned with the question since and will 
continue to be so until the 2009 Review Conference.  
3.4.1 Preparatory Commission 
As previously noted, Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference 
established a Preparatory Commission with several tasks, one of which was 
to prepare proposals for a provision on the crime of aggression to be 
included in the Rome Statute. According to paragraph 8 of Resolution F, the 
work was to be concluded with the entry into force of the Rome Statute. 
 At the outset of the elaborations in the Commission, work progressed at 
a slow pace. Partly this was because it had no exact deadline for delivering a 
proposal, and partly because organisational issues were time-consuming. 
The organisational issues mainly concerned the question of how to establish 
a Working Group on the crime of aggression.188 However, the establishment 
was achieved by the Commission’s second session in August 1999.189 In the 
early days of the Working Group, delegations tended to simply repeat 
statements of positions that had previously been put forward. Christopher K. 
Hall explains that two texts helped in turning the discussion into a more 
focused one; first, a consolidated text of proposals190 and second, a 
discussion paper191 with a list of issues related to the crime of aggression 
that needed to be resolved. The Coordinator for the Working Group 
prepared both of these texts. 
 The issues of discussion rapidly crystallised into two main questions. 
First, diverging views where expressed on what a definition of the crime 
would look like. Preferences varied from those supporting a generic 
definition, to those supporting a specific approach containing a list of acts. 
Secondly, the question of the conditions under which the ICC should 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime caused debate amongst delegations. In 
the eyes of some, like the permanent members of the Security Council, a 
determination by the Council was necessary, while some saw a role for 
other UN organs, like the ICJ or the General Assembly, if the Council failed 
to act.192 That it was precisely these two questions that were at the centre of 
attention could not have come as a big surprise to the delegations. An 
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unfortunate line of continuous disagreement upon precisely these issues can 
be seen when looking back at the discussions taking place both prior to and 
during the Rome Conference. 
 Let us now turn our attention to some of the concrete proposals put 
forward in the Preparatory Commission. The two main questions, i.e. a 
definition and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, will be 
addressed separately. First, one should note that the two main questions are 
profoundly interlinked. Not least, this follows from the fact that some of the 
proposals submitted mutually managed the questions. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that in the interests of clarity and coherence, the questions will 
benefit from being dealt with separately, and this approach will be applied 
throughout the remaining parts of this thesis. 
3.4.1.1 Definition 
 Several proposals were discussed in the Preparatory Commission 
regarding the question of a definition of the crime of aggression. However, 
three or possibly four main alternative definitions can be said to have 
formed a basis of the discussions. 
 First, one option was to base the definition on the ‘crimes against peace’ 
provision in the Nuremberg Charter of 1945. The Russian Federation 
advocated this line and delivered a proposal describing the crime in a 
generic way as ‘any of the following acts: planning, preparing, initiating, 
carrying out a war of aggression’.193 Limiting the crime to acts connected 
with a ‘war of aggression’ can be problematic. Roger S. Clark has pointed 
out that there is no indication whether the term goes beyond the types of 
acts of aggression listed in the General Assembly Resolution 3314. Thus, in 
his opinion, what amounts to a ‘war of aggression’ remains unclear and the 
term ‘seems an unhelpful concept’.194
 Under a second option, aggression would be given a generic definition 
combined with an exhaustive or illustrative list of acts amounting to 
aggression taken from Resolution 3314, seen as an authoritative source of 
existing customary international law. A group of Arab States produced a 
proposal including attacks ‘depriving other peoples of their rights to self-
determination, freedom and independence’ in the generic part of the 
definition. This was combined with an illustrative list of acts taken verbatim 
from Article 3 of Resolution 3314, making it a kind of mixed approach.195 
Julius Stone commented as early as 1958 on the problems linked with a 
mixed approach, stating that the inclusion of a list of acts would result in 
‘doubt as to the adequacy of the definition in the general clause’.196 If the 
list is made exhaustive, Matthias Schuster has observed that it has the 
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‘disadvantage of not being able to conclusively list every possible situation 
in which aggression can be said to occur’.197
 Living in a world where the types of weapons and methods of warfare 
are developing more rapidly than probably ever before, one could surely 
find it adequate to support this conclusion. Certainly, it is not too far-fetched 
to believe that a situation could arise, not covered by an exhaustive list, 
where the acts committed bears the resemblance and guilt of a crime of 
aggression. Yet, if the ICC were to punish the individuals responsible in 
such a situation, it would run counter to the principle of nulla poene, nullum 
crimen sine lege. Unquestionably, the ICC wants to avoid such a situation. 
 As a third option, several States submitted proposals providing for a 
generic approach, focusing on the use of armed force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in violation of the 
UN Charter. A joint proposal by Greece and Portugal followed this model: 
‘For the purposes of the present Statute, aggression means the use of 
armed force, including the initiation thereof, by an individual who is 
in a position of exercising control or directing the political or military 
action of a State, against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of a State in violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.’198
In an explanatory note to the proposal, it was explained that the generic 
approach was chosen with the intent of making it easier to reach agreement 
on a definition. It was held that a definition with an illustrative list was not 
suited for attributing individual criminal responsibility, and that it was 
difficult to include all potential acts amounting to aggression in an 
exhaustive list. Nevertheless, Resolution 3314 would remain relevant for the 
ICC when determining whether a particular act or course of action by an 
individual constituted aggression.199
 Following the line of a generic approach to a definition, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania delivered a somewhat innovative 
joint proposal. The novelty of the proposal was that it distinguished between 
the concepts of a crime of aggression, committed by an individual, and an 
act of aggression, committed by a State: 
‘1. A person commits the crime of aggression who, being in a position 
to exercise control over or direct the political or military action of a 
State, intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in 
the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression 
committed by that State. 
2. For the purpose of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the 
crime of aggression under the Statute, aggression committed by a 
State means the use of armed force to attack the territorial integrity or 
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political independence of another State in violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.’200
In a commentary to the proposal, the drafters admitted that a provision only 
needed to define the crime of aggression. However, they felt that a 
clarification of what acts of aggression could trigger individual criminal 
responsibility was necessary, since it worked as a precondition for the crime 
to arise. The terms ‘intentionally and knowingly’, introduced into the first 
paragraph to describe the necessary mental element, could be superfluous as 
it merely repeated the ‘intent and knowledge’ used in Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute. However, it was explained that the inclusion of a mental 
element could help in determining how the crime fits together as a whole. 
Furthermore, it was clarified that the definition in the second paragraph had 
no effects on international law on aggression, such as Resolution 3314, 
beyond the scope of the Rome Statute.201 Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, 
Coordinator of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, has 
explained that the proposal was seen by many delegations as ‘an important 
step forward, at least from a methodological point of view’.202
 Finally, as a possible fourth option, included within the model of a 
generic approach, the German delegation reiterated the view held at the 
Preparatory Committee stages and delivered a proposal. The proposed 
definition was literally the same as had been delivered at the earlier stages, 
including a necessary link of that acts had to have the object or the effect of 
a military occupation or of an annexation of the territory of another State.203 
Hans-Peter Kaul, Head of the German ICC Delegation, has admitted that the 
German approach ‘is a somewhat restrictive approach, probably too 
restrictive’ and that it does not take into account modern weapon 
technology.204
 Even though the proposals indicate a wide range of views on what to 
include into a definition of the crime of aggression, at least two aspects of 
the crime appear to have achieved general agreement amongst participants 
in the Preparatory Commission. First, the crime of aggression is a 
‘leadership crime’. In other words, there must be an individual who is in a 
position of control and leadership in the attacking State whose conduct 
played a part in the attack taking place. Secondly, individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression requires that an act of aggression, 
giving rise to State responsibility, has occurred.205
 The Preparatory Commission had until the conclusion of the first 
meeting of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC to come up with a final 
proposal. As it became evident that consensus could not be reached, the 
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issue of finding a provision for the crime of aggression was deferred to the 
first Assembly of States Parties, to take place in September 2002. As a 
substitute for a completed proposal, the final work-product on the crime of 
aggression was a Discussion Paper proposed by the Coordinator of the 
Working Group (2002 Discussion Paper).206 In it, the methodological 
approach proposed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania 
of distinguishing between ‘crime of aggression’ and ‘act of aggression’ was 
followed. The Coordinator has explained that the 2002 Discussion Paper 
intended to deal solely with the definition of the crime of aggression and 
deliberately avoided defining the acts of aggression entailing State 
responsibility. In her opinion, this meant that the controversial discussion of 
choosing between a generic or specific definition could be avoided.207
 According to the first paragraph of the 2002 Discussion Paper, the basis 
for a definition would be found in a generic approach. Resembling an 
updated version of the formulation contained in the Nuremberg Charter, it 
reflected the common understanding of aggression as a leadership crime 
requiring the occurrence of an act of aggression: 
‘1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime 
of aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person 
intentionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a flagrant 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Option 1: Add “such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act 
which has the object or result of establishing a military occupation 
of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof”. 
Option 2: Add “and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes 
an act which has the object or the result of establishing a military 
occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part 
thereof”. 
Option 3: Neither of the above.’ 208
The above three different options referred to the gravity required for the 
crime of aggression to arise, often referred to as the issue of threshold.209 
Option 2, resembling the proposal put forward by Germany, presented a 
very narrow case, requiring a war of aggression or alternatively a military 
occupation or annexation. Bearing a clear resemblance to the Greek-
Portuguese proposal, option 3 opened for a rather broad definition. By 
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declining to include an additional threshold, it is enough for the conduct to 
constitute a flagrant violation of the UN Charter. Option 1, can be placed 
somewhere in-between the other options. The use of the terms ‘such as’ 
indicates that the specified acts are only examples of acts viable for 
punishment. However, the mere inclusion of these examples might be 
interpreted as an indication that an additional amount of gravity is required. 
 The second paragraph concerned acts of aggression and was based on 
the idea that acts of aggression were related to State responsibility and had 
already been defined through General Assembly Resolution 3314.210 Thus, 
the Preparatory Commission did not have to define acts of aggression and 
the second paragraph simply referred to the Resolution, stating that: 
‘2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means an act 
referred to in United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, which is determined to have been 
committed by the State concerned, 
Option 1: Add “in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5”. 
Option 2: Add “subject to a prior determination by the Security 
Council of the United Nations”.’211
Option 1 and 2 concern the question of the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, which will be returned to shortly. 
 A reasonable conclusion on the work accomplished by the Preparatory 
Commission on the definitional part is that that it is possible to find both 
positive and negative aspects. On the downside, it must be seen as a 
disappointment that a final proposal could not be delivered to the Assembly 
of States Parties. The inability of participating States to reach a compromise 
resulted in that the contents of the crime of aggression remained unclear and 
that it continued to be linked to a high degree of uncertainty. On a positive 
note, the vast amount of proposals delivered showed that the question was 
still of great importance to many States. Furthermore, States had at least 
reached general agreement on parts of the crime, namely its character as a 
leadership crime and that it only exists in connection with an act of 
aggression. However, the most important breakthrough might have been the 
change in the methodological way of approaching the crime. The separation 
of the crime of aggression from the act of aggression presented an 
interesting way forward for future elaborations on the crime. The novelty of 
this methodological approach is that it indicates that States must focus on 
trying to find a definition for the crime of aggression rather than discussing 
when a State has committed an act of aggression. 
3.4.1.2 Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Like with the question of a definition, the question of the conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was the object of 
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several proposals at the Preparatory Commission negotiations. The basis of 
the negotiations can be divided into three main models. 
 First, one model was based on the view of the Security Council as the 
only organ authorised to make a determination that an act of aggression has 
occurred, in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter. Thus, the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction were settled by giving the Council 
an exclusive role. The previously mentioned Russian proposal on a 
definition was made ‘subject to a prior determination by the United Nations 
Security Council’.212 A similar proposal was delivered by Germany.213 
Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko has criticised this approach, claiming that the 
role of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is 
not exclusive. In his opinion, the ICC ‘must have power to pronounce for 
itself on the existence or non-existence of aggression for the purpose of 
seizing or declining to seize itself with jurisdiction over individuals – the 
architects of the crime’.214
 As a second model, the ICC would get a chance to step in if the Security 
Council failed to make a determination within a certain period. Proposals 
adhering to this model can be seen as compromise proposals. While 
admitting the primary responsibility of the Council, this model assures that 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is upheld in case of failure to act by the former. A 
joint proposal by Greece and Portugal followed this line, providing that the 
ICC must first seek whether the Council has made a determination and, if 
not, request such a determination. If the Council were to fail to act within 12 
months, the proposal stipulated that ‘the Court shall proceed with the case in 
question.’215
 In an explanatory note to the proposal, the authors explained that if the 
Security Council were to make a determination in accordance with Article 
39 of the UN Charter that aggression has occurred, it has to be taken into 
account by the ICC. The explanatory note also made clear that the role of 
the Council was not exclusive and that the proposed provision was an 
option, not an obligation, for the Council to act. In addition, the proposed 
period of 12 months was to be seen as ‘purely indicative and may be 
shortened’.216 Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko points out that the proposal tries to 
accord due recognition to the Security Council’s role in issues of 
aggression, without making it an exclusive one. Nevertheless, he argues that 
even where the Council has made a determination it should not be binding 
on the ICC.217
 Under a third model, other organs, such as the General Assembly or the 
ICJ, would be involved in the process of making the determination that an 
act of aggression has occurred. Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and 
Romania tabled a proposal following this model. It is by far the most 
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extensive and complex proposal delivered at the Preparatory Commission 
negotiations. In short, the ICC is allowed to proceed with a case if it is 
referred to them by the Security Council in accordance with Article 13(b) of 
the Rome Statute, but must in all other cases ascertain whether the Council 
has made a determination, acting under Article 39 of the UN Charter. There 
are three possible outcomes of the ICC’s inquiries. First, if the Council has 
made a positive determination, the ICC may proceed with the investigation 
and possible prosecution. Secondly, in case of the opposite, i.e. that an act 
of aggression has not taken place, the ICC is barred from proceeding with 
the case. Finally, if no determination has been made, the ICC should notify 
the Council of the situation at hand so that action may be taken. The major 
innovation of the proposal is found in the fifth and sixth paragraphs. They 
contain a special mechanism in case the Council does not make any 
determination or invoke the deferral provision in Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute within six months from the date of notification. If that is the case, 
the ICC may request the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion 
from the ICJ, in accordance with Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 
65 of the Statute of the ICJ, on the legal question of whether or not 
aggression has been committed by the State concerned. If the outcome of 
the ICJ advisory opinion is that there has been aggression, the ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 218
 Matthias Schuster has commented on a previous proposal by the same 
States containing the same innovative mechanism. In his opinion, the 
involvement of the General Assembly results in a disregard of the Security 
Council’s responsibilities. In addition, there is a possibility that the ICJ 
could decide on matters without the consent of either State Party to the 
dispute, which could ‘undermine the legitimacy of the International Court of 
Justice in the eyes of all States’.219
 In the Coordinator’s 2002 Discussion Paper, the issue of the conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction was dealt with in paragraphs four and five 
and the multiple versions contained therein. Under the fourth paragraph the 
ICC should first ascertain whether the Council has made a determination, 
and if not, notify the Council so that appropriate action may be taken. The 
fifth paragraph tried to include all alternatives put forward during the 
negotiations concerning what course of action to take when there is no 
determination by the Security Council: 
‘5. Where the Security Council does not make a determination as to 
the existence of an act of aggression by a State: 
Variant (a) or invoke article 16 of the Statute within six months from 
the date of notification. 
Variant (b) [Remove variant a.] 
Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case. 
Option 2: the Court shall dismiss the case. 
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Option 3: the Court shall, with due regard to the provisions of 
Articles 12, 14 and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly of 
the United Nations to make a recommendation within [12] months. In 
the absence of such a recommendation, the Court may proceed with 
the case. 
Option 4: the Court may request 
Variant (a) the General Assembly 
Variant (b) the Security Council, acting on the vote of any nine 
members, 
to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, in 
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute 
of the International Court, on the legal question of whether or not an 
act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. The 
Court may proceed with the case if the International Court of Justice 
gives an advisory opinion that an act of aggression has been 
committed by the State concerned. 
Option 5: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International 
Court of Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under 
Chapter II of its Statute that an act of aggression has been committed 
by the State concerned.’220
The Coordinator has admitted that the 2002 Discussion Paper does not even 
attempt to reconcile the multiple proposals discussed during the negotiations 
in the Preparatory Commission. The outcome is a document that cannot be 
seen as very progressive. It merely lists all the different proposals put 
forward during negotiations. However, the acceptance in the fourth 
paragraph of the primary role of the Security Council in defining the act of 
aggression for the purpose of the crime might be seen as a step forward. It 
could help to clarify the ambivalent views reflected in the content of Article 
5 of the Rome Statute. 221
 The obvious disagreement on how to solve the issue of the conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction might be sought in the fact that the question 
can be seen as trying to interpret the UN Charter. A future provision cannot 
be in contravention of the UN Charter, as referred to in Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Statute and as a consequence of the primacy established in Article 
103 of the UN Charter. However, the UN Charter does not really address the 
situation at hand. It merely declares that the Security Council has a primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and 
that it for the purpose of Chapter VII-action may determine the existence of 
an act of aggression. Therefore, the proposals put forward on the issue are 
characterised by their conflicting interpretations of the UN Charter, 
evidently influenced by their respective political interests. 
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 Two other approaches deserve mentioning, that were neither really 
discussed nor included in the 2002 Discussion Paper. First, Daniel D. 
Ntanda Nsereko has argued that the ICC itself should be able to make a 
determination for the purpose of establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for the crime of aggression. In his opinion, the right of the 
Security Council to request the ICC to defer investigation or prosecution 
according to Article 16 of the Rome Statute should be a sufficient safeguard. 
He believes that this would be consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
UN Charter and recognise the primary responsibility of the Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.222
 Antonio Cassese has expressed a similar view when advocating that the 
ICC should be able to act without interference from the Council and initiate 
investigations into whether aggression has been committed. In his view, 
‘judicial review of aggression might prove a useful counterbalance to the 
monopolizing power of the Security Council’.223 Secondly, in the 1998 
Draft Statute, prepared by the Preparatory Committee, the approach of a 
negative determination by the Security Council was included.224 
Apparently, this idea did not receive much consideration in the Preparatory 
Commission, since it was not discussed in any proposal or discussion paper. 
Seeing as the approach of a negative determination is a rather interesting 
and distinct approach, one could argue that it is a bit unfortunate that the 
Preparatory Commission did not discuss it further. 
3.4.1.3 Other Issues and Concluding Work 
 The Preparatory Commission was not only concerned with the questions 
of a definition and of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
According to Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference, it was 
also to prepare proposals on the Elements of the crime of aggression.225 
Even though a segment of the Elements was included in the 2002 
Discussion Paper, based on a Samoan proposal, there was in actuality very 
little time devoted to discussing the question.226 Roger S. Clark, 
representative of the Samoan delegation to the Preparatory Commission, 
believes that the Elements are not only important for their own sake, but 
also ‘equally important for the light that it might shed on technical aspects 
of the “definition” and “conditions,”.’227 Clark makes an interesting point 
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when he points out that a shift in focus towards the more technical aspects 
of the crime might be one way to achieve a breakthrough on the other 
questions. It makes even more sense when one keeps in mind that the focus 
for the definitional part should be on trying to define the crime of aggression 
rather than dwelling on when a State has committed an act of aggression. A 
combination of these two ways forward could be of use for future 
discussions on the crime of aggression. 
 As previously mentioned, the Preparatory Commission did not succeed 
in delivering a final proposal on the crime of aggression to the Assembly of 
States Parties, but instead delivered a Report containing the 2002 Discussion 
Paper.228 The Report also contained the text of a Draft Resolution, calling 
for the creation of another Special Working Group. The new Special 
Working Group on the crime of aggression was to have an open-ended 
character, open not only to States Parties of the Rome Statute but also to all 
member States of the United Nations and specialized agencies. Resembling 
Resolution F, the Draft Resolution declared in the third paragraph that the 
Special Working Group should ‘submit such proposals to the Assembly for 
its consideration at a Review Conference’.229 In September 2002, the 
Assembly of States Parties decided to adopt the Draft Resolution and 
thereby the ‘Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression’ (Special 
Working Group) was established.230 In conclusion, States once again 
‘agreed to disagree’ on a provision on the crime of aggression and decided 
that further consultations on the crime were required.231
3.4.2 Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression 
Work within the Special Working Group has progressed mainly through 
yearly inter-sessional meetings, held at Princeton University, United States. 
This work is examined below by presenting a brief view of the preliminary 
stages before turning attention to the core issues of a definition and the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in detail. 
3.4.2.1 Preliminary Work 
The work within the Special Working Group did not really take off until it 
was decided to hold an inter-sessional meeting at Princeton University in 
June 2004. The primary focus of the meeting was to address technical 
aspects of the crime of aggression that had not been previously addressed. 
Questions receiving the attention of the participants were for example the 
incorporation and placement of the provisions on aggression in the Statute 
and its relationship to general principles of criminal law as contained in Part 
three of the Rome Statute. As an example, diverging views were expressed 
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on the question if Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, listing different forms 
of participation, should be applicable to the crime of aggression. Some 
participants felt that a future provision on a definition of the crime could 
itself contain the different forms of participation and exclude the 
applicability of Article 25(3), as had been the case with the 2002 Discussion 
Paper. Others argued that Article 25(3) should remain applicable, either in 
its entirety or partially. Unlike a previous proposal in the Preparatory 
Commission232, it was clarified that to include a mental element in the 
definition would be superfluous, as this was already contained in Article 30. 
The focus on technical aspects meant that the core issues of a definition and 
of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, was left aside with the 
understanding that significant progress was unlikely. In conclusion, some 
points of consensus were reached in agreeing that a future provision on 
aggression be incorporated into the Rome Statute rather than in a separate 
instrument and that some provisions in Part three needed to be revisited at a 
later stage..233 Several of the participating States deemed the strategy to 
begin the work within the Special Working Group on technical aspects a 
success, as it helped in accelerating a constructive atmosphere.234
 Little time was allocated to the Special Working Group for discussing 
the issues relating to the crime of aggression during the Third Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties. Most of the time was spent trying to get the 
delegates to adopt the 2004 Princeton Report; which resulted in that the 
Assembly of States Parties carried it forward as a working document and 
annexed it to its own Report of its Third Session.235
 Nevertheless, some States found the time to offer opinions on the core 
issues. Concerning the definitional part, both Germany and Russia reiterated 
their support for a generic approach to a definition, though mindful of the 
importance of General Assembly Resolution 3314. Other opinions included 
Cuba’s, expressing concern that the definition should cover the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, and Turkey, pointing to the fact that non-State 
actors could also be perpetrators. Concerning the question of the conditions 
for the exercise of jurisdiction, Russia reiterated its belief that Security 
Council involvement was necessary and exclusive, while New Zealand 
reminded everyone of the possible involvement of the ICJ.236 In conclusion, 
the limitations of time resulted in that the elaborations on a definition and 
the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction cannot be said to have 
progressed much at the Third Session of the Assembly of States Parties. 
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 More recently, the core issues have received the increasing attention of 
the Special Working Group. Let us now proceed by considering the two 
questions separately. 
3.4.2.2 Definition 
In June 2005, delegations returned to Princeton to hold a second inter-
sessional meeting. The discussions took off from where the previous 
meeting had ended in discussing technical issues of the crime, such as its 
relationship to general principles of criminal law as contained in Part three 
of the Rome Statute. Much time was spent discussing the link between the 
crime of aggression and Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, concerning 
forms of participation resulting in individual criminal responsibility. The 
2002 Discussion Paper was used as a starting point for discussions. In its 
first paragraph, the different forms of participation were incorporated into 
the Article defining the crime, and consequently the third paragraph 
excluded the applicability of Article 25(3).237
 Several delegations questioned this approach, and contemplated on an 
approach allowing the applicability of Article 25(3) to the crime of 
aggression. The idea was to keep the definition of the crime rather narrow 
and to insert a new subparagraph to Article 25(3), clarifying that it was 
applicable to the crime of aggression insofar as it was compatible with the 
leadership nature of the crime. The reason for the emphasis on a new 
paragraph was that then the leadership requirement needed to be fulfilled in 
all cases, whereas Article 25(3) contained alternative requirements set forth 
in subparagraphs (a)–(d).238 Two proposals were presented for a rewording 
of the first paragraph of the 2002 Discussion Paper, containing the insertion 
of new subparagraph to Article 25(3): 
‘Proposal A 
Definition, paragraph 1: 
“For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a ‘crime of 
aggression’ when, being in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person 
participates actively in an act of aggression …” 
 
Article 25, paragraph 3 
Insert a new subparagraph (d) bis: 
“In respect of the crime of aggression, paragraph 3, sub paragraphs (a) 
to (d), apply only to persons who are in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.” 
Proposal B 
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Definition, paragraph 1: 
“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means engaging 
a State, when being in a position effectively to exercise control over or 
to direct the political or military action of that State, in 
[…collective/State act].” 
Article 25 
Insert a new paragraph 3 bis 
“In respect of the crime of aggression, only persons being in a position 
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of the State shall be criminally responsible and liable for 
punishment.” 
(Article 25, paragraph 3, does apply to the crime of aggression.)’239
The proposed approach to apply Article 25(3) to the crime of aggression 
evidently resulted in a new way of formulating the definition of the crime. 
As previously noted, Roger S. Clark held that consideration of technical 
aspects might aid in finding a definition of the crime.240 In the case of the 
2005 Princeton Report, he appears to be correct. Considerations of technical 
aspects resulted in two interesting proposals that approached the definition 
in a new way. The new approach appears to be to focus the definition on the 
principal conduct amounting to a crime of aggression and to let Article 
25(3) handle the various forms of participation. As a result, a slimmer 
definition is introduced. However, a possible problem could be to find a 
suitable term describing the punishable conduct. In the case of the two 
proposals, ‘engaging a State’ and ‘participates actively’ are used. 
 Following in the line of the methodological approach envisaged by the 
2002 Discussion Paper, the definition of acts of aggression was dealt with 
separately. The general view expressed at Princeton was that a generic 
approach was preferable when considering acts of aggression.241 It was felt 
that a specific approach containing an illustrative list would oppose the 
principle of legality, and that an exhaustive list would be difficult to 
produce.242
 In the end of 2005, the Special Working Group gathered for the Fourth 
Session of the Assembly of States Parties and adopted the 2005 Princeton 
Report. Furthermore, three Discussion Papers were introduced covering 
different aspects of a provision on the crime of aggression. The intention of 
the Discussion Papers was to highlight areas that needed further 
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consideration.243 The Assembly of States Parties took note of the Special 
Working Groups report and decided to annex the 2005 Princeton Report as 
well as the three Discussion Papers to its own Report.244
 Discussion Paper 1 concerns the relationship between the crime of 
aggression and Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute. It describes the approach 
contained in the 2002 Discussion Paper as a ‘monistic approach’. Such an 
approach includes the individual conduct linking the individual to the State 
act of aggression, the conduct element, into the definition to cover all 
potential perpetrators and to cover all forms of participation and excludes 
the applicability of Article 25(3). The approach advocated at the 2005 
Princeton meeting is dubbed a ‘differentiated approach’, and differs in that it 
focuses on the conduct of the principal perpetrator in the definition of the 
crime. To cover other forms of participation it applies Article 25(3) (a)-(d), 
to the crime of aggression.245
 Both approaches are explained to have their respective merits and flaws. 
The monistic approach is a rather simple approach in that it tries to cover all 
individuals by using a general formula of participation in the State act of 
aggression. On the downside, by excluding certain provisions of Part 3 of 
the Rome Statute, it would differ from the drafting technique used for the 
other crimes under the Statute. The differentiated approach has the obvious 
appeal of being well suited for the drafting technique used for the Statute. A 
differentiated approach would require the drafters to come up with a suitable 
term to describe the conduct element of the crime in the definition. In other 
words, it must be defined what the commission of the crime of aggression 
means, in accordance with Article 25(3)(a). Only then will it be possible to 
attribute the other forms of participation.246
 However, it is explained that finding a suitable term to describe the 
conduct element is difficult. Three alternatives have been up for discussion, 
‘participates […] in [the collective act]’ and ‘engages a State in [the 
collective act]’, as presented in the Princeton 2005 Report, and ‘directs the 
[collective act]’, discussed in the margins of the 2005 Princeton meeting. 
According to the sub-Coordinator responsible for Discussion Paper 1, the 
last of these alternatives deserves more attention. In conclusion, it is 
suggested that the monistic approach is rewarded more attention and that the 
final choice as to which approach is preferable should not be made until 
both approaches have been fully considered.247
 Discussion Paper 3 involves the question of a definition of aggression in 
the context of the act committed by a State and like at the 2005 Princeton 
meeting, a generic approach is advocated. Yet again, the argument is raised 
that a specific approach containing an illustrative list would run counter to 
the principle of nullum crimen nulla poene sine lege, and that an exhaustive 
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list would be difficult to achieve. Without expressing a preference, several 
alternatives on how to define aggression by a State are listed: ‘Use of force’, 
‘Armed attack’, ‘Act of aggression’, ‘Use of armed force’, all of which are 
taken from different parts of the UN Charter and the General Assembly 
Resolution 3314.248
 The aim of the Discussion Papers was that they would work as a tool for 
the Special Working Group, helping it to focus on concrete questions that 
needed a solution. The trend to separate the crime of aggression from acts of 
aggression continues in the Discussion Papers. As previously argued, this 
could be a useful way forward in trying to find a future provision. Focus 
needs to be on trying to find a definition for the crime of aggression rather 
than on what acts of State amount to an act of aggression. 
 A third inter-sessional meeting took place at Princeton in June 2006. 
Throughout the meeting, particular attention was given to the issues 
identified in the mentioned Discussion Papers, which along with the 2002 
Discussion Paper formed the basis for the work. Concerning the question of 
a definition, a great deal of time was spent discussing the individual’s 
conduct and how to define it. In line with Discussion Paper 1, it was 
discussed in terms of either a monistic or a differentiated approach. As it 
had been the trend at the previous inter-sessional meeting, it was agreed that 
a differentiated approach was preferable in that it treated the crime of 
aggression in the same way as the other crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. However, the differentiated approach needed further elaboration, and 
consequently the monistic approach, as in the 2002 Discussion Paper, 
should not be entirely rejected.249
 As there was a preference for the differentiated approach, focus was on 
defining the conduct of the principal perpetrator, as Article 25(3) of the 
Rome Statute would cover the other forms of participation. There was 
agreement on that the crime was a leadership crime and reference should be 
made to the ability to influence policy. Another point of agreement was to 
avoid the term ‘participates’ to define the conduct element under the 
differentiated approach, since it might overlap with other forms of 
participation under Article 25(3). However, delegations disagreed on what 
term to use in its place and several suggestions were presented. The terms 
‘organize and direct’, ‘direct’ and ‘order’ were suggested, with the notion 
that these were frequently used in counterterrorism conventions and as such 
established in the context of international criminal law. Other suggestions 
presented were different forms of ‘engage’, as had been suggested at the 
2005 Princeton meeting, and ‘lead’, argued by some as the most accurate 
description of the conduct of a leader, and thus underlining the leadership 
role of the principal perpetrator. Concerns were raised that the latter might 
be too narrow and merely include a head of State or Government as 
principal perpetrator. Finally, disagreement also surfaced on whether to 
keep or delete the phrase ‘planning, preparation, initiation or execution’. 
Supporters of keeping the phrase pointed to the fact that it reflected the 
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typical features of aggression as a leadership crime, and those arguing for a 
deletion simply stated that Article 25(3) already covered it.250 The 
discussions resulted in an updated paper based on proposals A and B of 
appendix I of the 2005 Princeton Report: 
‘Proposal A 
For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a “crime of 
aggression” when, being in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, that person 
[leads] [directs] [organizes and/or directs] [engages in] 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Proposal B 
For the purpose of the present Statute, “crime of aggression” means 
[directing] [organizing and/or directing] [engaging a State/the 
armed forces or other organs of a State in] 
an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
when being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State. 
Under both proposals: 
Article 25, paragraph 3 
Insert a new subparagraph (d) bis: 
“In respect of the crime of aggression, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (a) 
to (d), apply only to persons who are in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.”  
(Article 25, paragraph 3, does apply to the crime of aggression. See 
also Elements of Crimes, paragraph 8 of the general introduction.)’251
The main difference between the two proposals is that the phrase ‘planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution’ is included in Proposal A, but deleted in 
Proposal B. Proposal B also uses the term ‘means’ in the initial phrase to 
bring it in line with the definitions of the other crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. It was clarified that this model could also be applied to Proposal 
A. Furthermore, the participants explained that the two Proposals merely 
reflected possible approaches to the conduct element under the 
differentiated approach, and different alternatives remained open for 
discussion.252
 As concerns defining the conduct of States, i.e. acts of aggression, the 
delegations followed the line of previous years. The majority favoured a 
generic approach, arguing that it was the most pragmatic approach, seeing 
as it would be difficult to cover all potential cases with a specific approach 
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and that the latter would be hard to combine with the respect of the principle 
of legality. Supporters of a specific approach argued that it was better suited 
to ensure legal clarity and consistency with the definitions of the other 
crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. In the end, delegations settled on 
agreeing ‘that the principle of legality should be safeguarded’.253
 In line with Discussion Paper 3, delegations at Princeton also discussed 
the question of how to describe the aggression by a State. Most delegates 
seemed to prefer to retain the notion of an ‘act of aggression’, while there 
was some support for using the term ‘armed attack’. However, participants 
pointed out that the practical implications of using different words might be 
limited since all of the four notions were used in different parts of 
Resolution 3314. In addition to discussing the quality of the act, there was 
also a brief discussion on the intensity of the act, encompassed in the 
qualifier ‘flagrant or manifest’. The phrase ‘which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations’ was used in paragraph 1 of the 2002 Discussion Paper.254
 Delegations were unable to reach a general agreement on whether such 
a qualifier was required, but held that if a qualifier was to be included the 
term ‘manifest’ was preferred over ‘flagrant’. Furthermore, a majority view 
held that the object or the result of an act of aggression, referred to in 
Options 1 and 2 of the 2002 Discussion Paper, should not be included in the 
first paragraph. The first paragraph concerned a definition of the crime of 
aggression. It was felt that, if included, the object or the result of an act of 
aggression related to the definition of an act of aggression, which should be 
contained exclusively in paragraph 2 of the 2002 Discussion Paper. 255 In 
other words, a majority supported that the definition of the crime of 
aggression, contained in paragraph 1, should be separated from the 
definition of an act of aggression, exclusively dealt with in paragraph 2. 
 It seems that Proposals A and B delivered at the 2006 Princeton meeting 
reflect an evolving discussion on a definition for the crime of aggression. 
There now seems to be a majority favouring the differentiated approach, at 
least in the Special Working Group. The present discussion focuses on 
trying to define the individual’s conduct, as a principal perpetrator, applying 
Article 25(3) to cover other forms of participation. Even though an 
appropriate term outlining the conduct element might be hard to come up 
with, it is still fair to say that the direction of the present discussions is 
encouraging. In addition, the methodological approach of distinguishing the 
individual and the related crime of aggression from the State and the related 
act of aggression, originally suggested in the Preparatory Commission, 
seems to have bared fruit. Interesting and important work is currently being 
done to try to find a feasible definition for the crime of aggression, 
alongside and separated from the discussions of what acts of States amount 
to an act of aggression. 
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3.4.2.3 Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
At the 2005 Princeton meeting, different aspects were discussed at length 
concerning the question of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
First, when considering the rights of the accused, States expressed general, 
but not total, agreement on that a potential determination by another organ 
on the occurrence of an act of aggression should not be binding on the ICC. 
Even though this might result in undesirable and conflicting findings by the 
ICC and the Security Council, if it was considered the appropriate organ to 
make such a determination, it was necessary to safeguard the rights of the 
accused.256 Justin Hogan-Doran and Bibi T. van Ginkel have commented on 
potential interference by the ICC in the activities of the Security Council. In 
their opinion, ‘whatever the short-term or conflict-specific concerns about 
the ‘interference’ of the Court’s role in the peacemaking activities of the 
Security Council, in the longer term the consensus of opinion is that it can 
only serve to reduce the resort to armed conflict by States’.257 It must be 
admitted that the potential of conflicting findings between the ICC and the 
Council would not be an ideal solution. However, this should not result in 
the infringement upon the rights of the accused. One must not forget that 
while the Council is concerned with the conduct of States, the ICC deals 
exclusively with individuals. 
 The delegations went on to consider whether a determination by another 
organ, generally viewed to be not binding on the ICC, was at all necessary 
and if it was, what organ should make such a determination. In the 
discussions, reference was made to Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute, 
requiring that a future provision on the crime of aggression need to be 
consistent with the UN Charter. States agreed on that this in fact required a 
future provision to be in line with the UN Charter, but disagreed on whether 
this implied that a determination of an act of aggression was necessary and 
whether the Security Council had the exclusive competence to make such a 
determination.258
 Two main approaches emerged during the discussions. One side 
favoured the exclusive competence of the Security Council, and the other 
recognised such competence for other organs as well, such as the General 
Assembly, ICJ and the Assembly of States Parties. Whereas supporters of 
the former approach voiced familiar arguments of the exclusive competence 
granted to the Council by Article 39 of the UN Charter, supporters of the 
latter approach held that an organ guided by political rather than legal 
considerations, was not well suited to make a determination. Furthermore, 
there was no reference to Article 39 of the UN Charter in Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Statute, and in any event, the role given to the Council was merely 
one of primary rather than exclusive competence. Finally, the participants 
also considered what would happen if the Council failed to act, where it was 
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vested with exclusive competence. No agreement could be reached on what 
course of action to apply if that were to be the case, but it was argued that 
the Prosecutor should be able to seize the Council or another competent 
organ with the question to proceed with the investigation. Only in the case 
where the Council made use of the procedure under Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, barring investigation or prosecution for a period of 12 months, 
would her hands be tied.259
 The main contribution of the 2005 Princeton meeting to the question of 
the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction appears to be the idea that a 
potential determination by another organ should not be binding on the ICC. 
As concerns other aspects of the question, it did not add anything substantial 
to the previous discussions. Arguments were reiterated from previous 
discussions on the issue. In comparison to the work being done on a 
definition on the crime of aggression at the same time, progress must be said 
to have evolved considerably slower on the question of the conditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction. 
 Of the three Discussion Papers introduced at the Fourth Session of the 
Assembly of States Parties, only Discussion Paper 2 is concerned with the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. Rather than discussing concrete 
drafting proposals, it tried to clarify the issues involved to enable agreement 
at a later stage, and included a long list of questions related to the issue. 
However, the most urgent questions were those linked to the issue of 
whether the Security Council had the exclusive right to determine that an act 
of aggression has occurred. The questions are based on a twofold approach 
and divided into two clusters of questions, A and B. Cluster A concern the 
option that a prior decision by another organ is necessary for the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction. Such a decision can either be in the form of a 
determination that aggression has occurred or of an explicit ‘go ahead’ for 
the ICC to proceed, with or without a determination of aggression by that 
organ. Cluster B concern the option that a decision by another body is not 
required for the ICC to start exercising jurisdiction, such as initiating 
investigations. However, the question is asked if it at a later stage should be 
up to another body to determine the occurrence of an act of aggression. If 
another body were indeed handed this right, such a determination would be 
binding for the ICC. With this line of thought, ‘the “go ahead” for the ICC 
to proceed and the judicially relevant determination of an act of aggression 
are not necessarily the same thing’.260
 In order to clarify this line of reasoning it might be appropriate to list 
the potential options resulting from the questions asked. To be able to do 
that, two of the questions listed in Discussion Paper 2 are given below: 
A. Should the ICC exercise jurisdiction of the crime of aggression 
only after another organ has accepted such exercise? 
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B. Should the determination of the state act be made by another organ 
prejudicially?261
The involvement of another organ in Question A covers both the case of a 
determination that an act of aggression has occurred, and an explicit ‘go 
ahead’ for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. Whether answering both the 
questions with a yes or a no, there are four alternative outcomes. First, the 
Prosecutor might be allowed initiate investigations without a decision by 
another organ, but any judgment would have to build on a determination of 
an act of aggression by another organ (No to A, Yes to B). The second and 
opposite option would require a decision by another organ to initiate 
investigation or prosecution, but it would be up to the ICC itself to 
determine whether an act of aggression, as a necessary element of the crime, 
has occurred (Yes to A, No to B). Under a third alternative, the ICC would 
require a decision by another organ to initiate investigations, and would also 
be bound by the determination of an act of aggression by another organ (Yes 
to A, Yes to B). Finally, there is the alternative that the ICC works 
independently from involvement of other organs (No to A, No to B). For 
clarification, this line of reasoning presupposes that an act of aggression 
must be determined before the existence of a crime of aggression can be 
determined; which is logical seeing as this assumption has not been 
challenged throughout the course of the Special Working Group.262
 The Discussion Paper presented on the issue of conditions for the 
exercise of jurisdiction is a rather brief document. Nevertheless, by breaking 
the issue down to explicit questions it may be a good point of departure for 
structuring the discussions on the issue. Its main contribution appears to be 
its twofold approach to a potential decision by another organ. On one hand, 
it must be decided whether such a decision is required even for the ICC to 
commence the exercise of jurisdiction, such as an investigation. On the 
other hand, it must be decided whether a determination of the occurrence of 
an act of aggression will be binding on the ICC, and thus have one of the 
decisive elements of the crime be definitively decided by an organ outside 
the ICC. Future work within the Special Working Group concerning the 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction need to explore the different 
alternatives and decide on a preferred position. The Discussion Paper might 
prove a useful tool in achieving that goal. 
 At the 2006 Princeton meeting, delegations apparently took note of the 
formula contained in Discussion Paper 2 and focused their discussions on 
the issues contained therein. One issue focused on was whether a decision 
by another organ was necessary for the ICC to commence its exercise of 
jurisdiction. The question was considered on the understanding that such a 
decision would consist of a determination that an act of aggression has 
occurred. Not surprisingly, States disagreed as to whether such a 
determination by the Security Council or another organ would work as a 
precondition for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. Some delegations argued 
that the crime of aggression should be treated in line with the other crimes 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, and therefore a prior determination by 
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another organ would not be necessary. Others argued that a prior 
determination by another organ was a possibility but that it should not be a 
precondition. On the opposite side were those expressing that a prior 
determination was indeed required, with a majority expressing a preference 
for the Security Council as the appropriate organ based on the role 
prescribed by the UN Charter. However, the role of the Council was 
questioned by delegations opposing a prior determination and others 
advocating a role for organs other than the Council. They held that the 
Rome Statute in Articles 13(b), the possibility for the Council to refer 
matters to the Prosecutor, and 16, the right to defer for a period of 12 
months, already adequately dealt with the role of the Council. In addition, 
the well-known arguments of the Council’s role as being primary rather than 
exclusive resurfaced. In any case, that other organs might have the 
competence to make such a determination could not be disregarded.263
 Mark S. Stein disagrees with the majority of the delegations advocating 
a prior determination, favouring the Security Council based on UN Charter 
arguments. He presents an interesting opinion in stating that there are 
powerful Charter-based arguments in favour of denying the Council this 
right. According to Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, the principle of 
sovereign equality should form a basis for the member States, including the 
right of juridical equality. A prior determination by the Council would allow 
permanent members to shield their leaders from prosecution of the crime of 
aggression by making use of its veto. Such consequent immunity would be 
in contravention to the principle of sovereign equality as established by the 
UN Charter. However, recognising that a political compromise protecting 
the permanent members might be necessary, a compromise proposal is 
delivered. This would allow the ICC to proceed through preliminary stages 
without Council approval, only for it to be required to hold a trial.264
 Delegations at the 2006 Princeton meeting went on to confront the issue 
from the hypothetical view that a Security Council decision was required for 
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction. Such a decision apparently did not have to 
be in the form of a determination of an act of aggression but could also take 
the form of a ‘go ahead’. Diverging views were expressed on what would be 
the preferred position, with those advocating the latter claiming it could be 
seen as handing the Council a useful additional policy option. In addition, 
they left the question of the final determination of the occurrence of an act 
of aggression open to the possibility that either the ICC itself or the Council 
could make such a determination. Others criticised this view and reiterated 
the idea that a clear determination that an act of aggression had occurred by 
the Council was a necessary precondition from the outset of the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the ICC.265
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 Finally, the prejudicial nature of a potential determination of an act of 
aggression by another organ was considered. In other words, would the 
determination work as a legally binding determination that could not be 
refuted in court by the accused. There seemed to be a majority favouring the 
idea of a non-binding character letting the determination be open for review 
by the ICC. Foremost of the arguments advocating this idea was the 
necessity to safeguard the defendant’s right to due process. It was noted that 
it should always be possible for the defence to challenge the case of the 
Prosecutor on all grounds. New evidence might emerge after a 
determination had been made by another organ and the defence should be 
free to use this and the ICC to consider it. The potential conflict with a 
decision by another organ, such as the Security Council, was highlighted by 
admitting that States needed to be aware of its potential implications.266
 Like had been the case all through the work of the Special Working 
Group, the 2002 Discussion Paper formed the basis for discussion. In 
paragraph 5, it included various options in the case that the Security Council 
failed to make a determination of an act of aggression. When reviewed by 
the delegations at Princeton various views were presented on what line to 
follow in case of the Council’s failure to act. Even though, most States 
favoured deleting options 3 and 4 in the 2002 Discussion Paper, they did so 
for different reasons and none of the options can be said to have completely 
lost their relevance.267
 Aided by Discussion Paper 2 in focusing the discussions on concrete 
questions, the 2006 Princeton meeting did indeed bring about a much-
needed discussion on the question of the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction. Valid points were raised on whether prior approval is required 
for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction and if a final determination by another 
organ should have a binding character. As a point of encouraging consensus, 
there now appears to be a general view that a determination by another 
organ should be open for review by the ICC. However, reading the 2006 
Princeton Report on the segment covering the question of the conditions for 
the exercise of jurisdiction is for the most part merely a reiteration of 
arguments heard long before. The process of developing a future provision 
setting out the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, consistent with the 
relevant provision of the UN Charter, appears to be moving along at a rather 
hesitant pace. The Special Working Group clearly needs to step up the pace 
a few notches with the 2009 Review Conference approaching rapidly. 
3.4.2.4 Roadmap to the Review Conference 
At the 2005 Princeton meeting, delegations agreed on a roadmap setting out 
the work of the Special Working Group up until the 2009 Review 
Conference. Work was to be concluded at the latest 12 months prior to the 
Review Conference. This would allow for necessary domestic political 
considerations needed for the adoption of a provision on the crime of 
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aggression at the Conference.268 Furthermore, a proposed timetable for the 
future work of the Special Working Group reveals that it now has less than 
20 days to prepare a final set of proposals, to submit to the Assembly of 
States Parties for consideration at the 2009 Review Conference.269
3.4.2.5 Reflections 
The work conducted by the Special Working Group on the crime of 
aggression has seen some encouraging and some less encouraging results. In 
the case of a definition of the crime of aggression, the discussion has 
progressively developed in an encouraging way. There now seems to be 
general agreement that a definition of the crime of aggression should be 
separated from the definition of the act of aggression. It is difficult to be 
entirely convinced that discussing what acts by a State amount to an act of 
aggression should be allocated so much time within the Special Working 
Group. A useful instrument, General Assembly Resolution 3314, already 
exists in this field of law. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to see that the 
focus of the discussion seems to be on defining the crime of aggression. 
This is what the Special Working Group needs to be doing, since the ICC is 
concerned with individual criminal responsibility and Article 5(2) of the 
Rome Statute is concerned with finding a provision for the crime of 
aggression. Admittedly, the crime of aggression may have some significant 
features of the involvement of a State, but this should not be used to steer 
away from defining the crime linked to the individual. In addition, the 
emerging preference for a differentiated approach will probably be useful in 
helping to reach consensus over a future proposal. 
 The work conducted on the question of the conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction has seen less encouraging results. True, there appears to be a 
majority advocating the non-binding character of a potential determination 
by another organ. However, in general delegations appear to be stuck on 
arguments dating back to the Rome Conference and beyond. Even though 
there have been extensive discussions, especially during the 2006 Princeton 
meeting, they have neither been very concrete nor progressing. Evidently, 
the main question to resolve is what role, if any, the Security Council should 
play. It is difficult to see how one could disagree with those claiming that 
the role envisaged for the Council by the UN Charter is a primary and not 
exclusive one. Furthermore, the competence to determine an act of 
aggression stipulated in Article 39 of the UN Charter must be interpreted to 
be limited to action in accordance with Chapter VII of the same Charter. 
Therefore, an exclusive role or even a role at all, for the Council in relation 
to ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is not evident. 
 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that a possible future provision on the 
issue will most certainly be one of political compromise and reality. It 
appears obvious that no single approach will be undisputedly accepted. 
Therefore, what needs to be worked out and agreed on is a political 
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compromise within the range of possible approaches. Such a political 
compromise might be hard to reach without admitting any role at all for the 
Security Council. In any case, the work conducted by the Special Working 
Group, and predecessors such as the Preparatory Commission, has indicated 
that one issue appears to be a bit more complicated and contentious than the 
other ones. That is the issue of conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
and especially the question of what role the Security Council should play in 
relation to the crime of aggression. Consequently, the Special Working 
Group needs to put a lot of effort into trying to find a feasible compromise 
on this issue, with the 2009 Review Conference just around the corner. 
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4 Sovereignty of States 
Why did it take more than 50 years for the international community to 
create a permanent International Criminal Court? Why is the question of 
finding a feasible provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion in the 
Rome Statute still such a contentious issue yet to be resolved? The answer 
to these questions might be found in the sovereignty of States. This chapter 
will present a brief introduction of the concept and then proceed to elaborate 
on its potential conflicts with the crime of aggression and the ICC. 
4.1 Generally 
International law has traditionally been based on a set of rules protecting the 
sovereignty of States and establishing their formal equality in law. As noted 
previously, the classical system of international law considered the 
sovereign State to be the only subject of international law, with an unlimited 
right to wage war to protect sovereign interests.270 The adoption of the UN 
Charter in 1945 amounted to a significant change in international law by 
banning the use of force and setting out a number of fundamental principles 
by which all the member States of the UN were to abide. According to 
Article 2(1), ‘The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members’. In 1974, the General Assembly Friendly 
Relations Declaration, as a General Assembly Resolution not binding per 
se, extended the principle of sovereign equality to all States, including 
States not members of the UN.271
 Antonio Cassese has described sovereign equality as ‘the linchpin of the 
whole body of international legal standards, the fundamental premise on 
which all international relations rest’.272 To describe the general rules of the 
concept, he divides it into two logically distinct notions, sovereignty and 
legal equality. Sovereignty includes the right to exercise authority over all 
individuals living in the territory and to freely use the territory under the 
State’s jurisdiction and perform activities beneficial to the population living 
there. In addition, State representatives acting in their official capacity and 
acts performed by the State in its sovereign capacity enjoys immunity from 
jurisdiction practised by foreign States. Legal equality means that States, 
irrespective of size or power, share the same juridical capacities and 
functions. In other words, all members of the international community must 
be treated on the same footing. 273
 Even though the principle of the sovereignty of States is firmly 
established within international law, States are certainly not equal as regards 
to power, territory and resources. States act within the context of an 
international order, but at the same time, they act on a basis of national 
policy. The action practised by a State in a given situation is often referred 
to by that State as the exercise of their sovereign right to act accordingly. 
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Occasionally, question marks may arise if the action, exercised in line with 
national policy, is congruent with evolving international law. Admittedly, 
that the principle of the sovereignty of States is a rather complicated issue. 
However, in the following we will settle for States as sovereign 
communities, with the related rights and duties, and equal to each other as 
subjects of international law. 
 The nexus between the crime of aggression and the principle of the 
sovereignty of States lies in the nature of the crime. The act of aggression by 
a State is a necessary precondition for the crime of aggression to arise. 
Consequently, the notion of the sovereignty of States has several areas that 
it touch upon the field of law related to the crime of aggression, such as acts 
pursued by States as a means of a sovereign right. 
4.2 Limiting the Sovereignty of States? 
One of the difficulties in the work of finding a feasible provision on the 
crime of aggression is that States cannot be fully aware of what acts of State 
will potentially be included in a future provision. Not until a provision is in 
place and the ICC is exercising jurisdiction over it, will States be able to 
find out what acts of State will be pursued for the purpose of holding 
individuals responsible for the crime of aggression. In the decades following 
the adoption of the UN Charter, the world has seen numerous examples of 
States resorting to the use of force. In explaining their action, States have 
used various headings, such as self-defence, including anticipatory and pre-
emptive self-defence, and humanitarian intervention. Not surprisingly, 
States practising such means feel cautious about ICC’s potential jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression. That a future provision could include such acts 
cannot be ruled out. In that case, States might argue that the provision is an 
infringement upon their sovereign rights. To illustrate the problem, a few 
concepts of international law will be presented below, such as anticipatory 
and pre-emptive self-defence and humanitarian intervention. This area of 
international law could by itself easily fill an entire thesis, and it is not the 
aim to describe it in detail. It will merely be used to illustrate possible 
conflicts with the crime of aggression in its relation to the sovereignty of 
States. 
4.2.1 Anticipatory and Pre-emptive Self-defence  
Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulates that the ‘inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defense’ is limited to situations where it appears as a 
response to an ‘armed attack’. Naturally, before acts of self-defence can be 
employed an actual armed attack must have occurred. However, a debate 
exists on whether anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence is permitted 
under Article 51, or possibly as a parallel rule of customary international 
law. Anticipatory self-defence can be described as employing a ‘pre-
emptive strike once a State is certain, or believes, that another State is about 
to attack it militarily’.274 The concept of anticipatory self-defence is 
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particularly interesting in a world where several States possesses modern 
weaponry, capable of launching rapid attacks without notice. The 
employment of pre-emptive strikes in self-defence has been used on a few 
occasions. For example, Israel employed such action, both in the ‘Six Days 
War’ of 1967 against its Arab neighbours, and again in 1981 against an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor.275 Antonio Cassese, while admitting that there may be 
justification on moral and political grounds, holds that ‘it is more judicious 
to consider such action as legally prohibited’.276
 Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 
now indicates support of an even more expanded right to pre-emptive self-
defence. A statement of policy on the issue was presented as part of the US 
National Security Strategy, often referred to as the ‘Bush Doctrine’.277 In it, 
mere threats, in particular those presented by terrorists and the potential use 
of weapons of mass destruction, are deemed to be sufficient for the 
employment of a right to pre-emptive self-defence.278
 In conclusion, whether called anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence, 
at present the concept is evidently a part of international law. States 
practising it obviously believe that the use of such means is within their 
sovereign right to employ self-defence. Without expressing a view on 
whether the employment of such self-defence is permissible or not, its 
existence has to be noted. It is by no means impossible that a future 
provision on the crime of aggression could cover acts held to be committed 
in the name of such self-defence. Therefore, States practising it may feel 
reluctant to find a provision for the crime of aggression or even to support 
the ICC, basing their concerns on possible infringements on the sovereignty 
of States. 
4.2.2 Humanitarian Intervention 
The latter part of the twentieth century witnessed the development of 
humanitarian intervention, positioning itself as a possible exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force. In short, the idea of the concept is that 
intervention in another State to protect the lives of persons living there, even 
though not nationals of the intervening State, may be permissible in certain 
situations. Such a situation is generally linked to the existence of gross 
violations of human rights in the State of intervention. The use of force in 
the name of a humanitarian intervention is not easily reconciled with the 
prohibition on the use of force against the ‘territorial integrity’ in Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter. Accepting humanitarian intervention as an 
exception to the prohibition on the use force would probably subject weaker 
States to the subjective opinions of more forceful States.279
 A recent example raising the issue of humanitarian intervention is the 
Kosovo crisis of 1999. In brief, NATO forces, acting out of area and 
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without UN authorisation, instigated a bombing campaign in the former 
Yugoslavia to protect the ethnic Albanian population. To justify its acts, 
NATO stated that action was taken in the name of humanitarian necessity. 
Following the use of force employed by NATO forces, the Security Council 
rejected a Resolution condemning the action, and instead passed a 
Resolution welcoming the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from the territory. 
However, it is hard to draw the conclusion that this is an example that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention is permissible. Malcolm Shaw 
summarises the issue when he states that humanitarian intervention was 
invoked in a crisis situation and received neither condemnation nor support. 
He concludes by stating that ‘It is not possible to characterise the legal 
situation as going beyond this’.280
 Without expressing an opinion on whether humanitarian intervention is 
reasonable or justifiable281, yet again it is sufficient to take note of its 
existence. States pursuing acts in the name of humanitarian intervention, for 
whatever reason, may feel reluctant to find a provision on the crime of 
aggression. With the possibility of a future provision covering such acts, 
they may feel that it amounts to a limitation on their sovereign right to act 
within the international community. If nothing else, the ongoing debate on 
humanitarian intervention, involving the interpretation of the rules 
governing the use of force and the sovereignty of States, may add to the 
difficulties in finding a feasible provision on the crime of aggression. 
4.2.3 Other issues 
In addition to anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence and humanitarian 
intervention, a few other issues related to the crime of aggression and its 
relationship to the sovereign equality of States might be of interest. 
 The crime of aggression, like any international crime, requires a mental 
element to make the performance of a particular act into a crime. This was 
the position at the Rome Conference and the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression explained that Article 30 of the Rome Statute, 
covering the mental element, was applicable to the crime of aggression. 
Matthias Schuster has argued that the special nature of the crime of 
aggression, with its necessary link to the act of a State, makes a 
determination of the mental element hard to come by. As the crime is 
restricted to individuals at the policy making level, it might be difficult to 
separate their possible mental element from that of the State itself. An 
additional problem is that it is hard to pinpoint whom the actual leaders are, 
i.e. to separate policy-making from policy-executing decisions.282
 Since it is impossible for a State to have a mental element, some 
confusion and difficulty may arise in trying to determine the mental element 
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of individuals at the policy-making level. The formation of States as 
sovereign entities makes the issue even more complicated. A future 
provision needs to be aware of this, and must be precise on what exactly the 
mental element of the crime entails. 
 The necessary involvement of a State in the commission of the crime 
has also raised the question of what to do about acts perpetrated by non-
State actors. Grant M. Dawson has observed that ‘terrorist or revolutionary 
groups can plan, initiate, and wage aggressive war with impunity’.283 In 
addition, Matthias Schuster has questioned why the regime used for war 
crimes, including acts perpetrated in internal armed conflicts, was not 
applied to the crime of aggression and notes that the majority of the 
conflicts following World War II have been of an internal nature. He sees an 
answer in that States fear an infringement upon their sovereignty by an 
international tribunal targeting their own citizens. However, it is admitted 
that such worries are intended to be washed away by the principle of 
complementarity applied to the Rome Statute, giving the State the first bite 
of the apple.284
 Arguments that the crime of aggression is at fault by excluding non-
State actors do not appear to be entirely convincing. The historical 
development of the crime of aggression into a crime entailing individual 
criminal responsibility has been on the basis that an act of aggression by a 
State is necessary prior to being able to hold an individual responsible. The 
idea to suddenly include non-State actors into the crime is neither feasible 
nor desirable; as such progress should develop gradually. Furthermore, 
certain acts of terrorism were discussed for inclusion in the Rome Statute as 
separate crimes. One could easily argue that crimes by non-State actors, 
such as terrorism, are better off being discussed separately from the crime of 
aggression. Those supporting its inclusion into the Rome Statute should 
work for an amendment of the Statute at a future Review Conference to 
include it as a separate crime, rather than trying to include it within the 
concept of a crime of aggression or make use of the Conventions already 
existing in that field of international law. 
4.3 The example of the United States 
Even though the ICC has received widespread support, some States remain 
rather sceptical. Issues of sovereignty, such as those just explained, might 
largely account for the negative attitude. One State opposing the ICC is the 
United States, which will be used below as an example to illustrate concerns 
raised against the ICC and action taken in the interest of upholding 
sovereign rights. While doing this, it is necessary to be fully aware of the 
unique political and military power that the United States possesses. 
 Whether or not looking to ratify it at some point, the United States in 
fact signed the Rome Statute as one of the final acts performed by the 
                                                 
283 Dawson, Grant M., ‘Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression?’ 19 N.Y.L. Sch. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. (2000), p. 444. 
284 Schuster, Matthias, ‘The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot in 
Search of a Sword’, 14 CLF (2003), pp. 22-23. 
 73
Clinton administration. After taking office, the new Bush administration 
showed a negative attitude towards the ICC and expressed its wish not to 
become a party to the treaty in a communication filed with the Secretary 
General in mid-2002.285
 The Unites States’ general opposition towards the ICC has shown itself 
in various forms during the recent years. For example, bilateral agreements 
have been concluded with several States to protect United States nationals 
from the ICC. They are usually referred to as Article 98 agreements, 
because of Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute preventing the ICC to proceed 
with a request to surrender an accused if this would require the requested 
State to breach an international agreement that it has made with another 
State. Intended to recognise status of forces agreements, granting a kind of 
immunity to foreign military forces based in another State, the United States 
have used the Article to shield all its nationals within States accepting such 
agreements. Furthermore, in July 2002 Security Council Resolution 1422 
was adopted, invoking Article 16 of the Rome Statute to defer potential 
cases concerning personnel from a State not Party to the Rome Statute 
arising from a United Nations established or authorised operation.286 The 
Resolution was created at the initiative of the United States threatening to 
otherwise veto against future peacekeeping and collective security 
operations. Its agreement with Article 16 can be questioned, since it 
contemplates a specific situation or investigation rather than a blanket case 
exclusion of a whole group of persons. Finally, in August 2002, the 
American Service Members’ Protection Act was signed into United States 
law, authorising the use force to free any citizen detained or imprisoned by 
the ICC. It was rapidly branded the ‘Hague Invasion Act’ by those opposing 
it, contemplating the bizarre scenario of United States troops invading the 
Hague to free its citizens.287  
 In addition, the United States has also expressed its particular concerns 
about the crime of aggression. David Scheffer, leader of the United States 
Delegation at the Rome Conference, expressed that the United States were 
concerned about the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the final text of 
the Rome Statute. They were concerned of the risk that a future provision 
would not contain the necessary linkage to a prior Security Council 
determination that an act of aggression has occurred. Therefore, legitimate 
use of military force may be hindered by targeting individuals. In his 
opinion, ‘This issue alone could fatally compromise the ICC’s future 
credibility’.288 A better solution would have been to follow the 1994 ILC 
Draft Statute, where action by the Security Council was required before any 
alleged crime of aggression could be prosecuted against an individual.289 
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Others sharing this view include William K. Lietzau and Ruth 
Wedgwood.290
 The position of the United States towards the ICC in general and the 
crime of aggression in particular should be interpreted in view of the fact 
that it participates extensively in peacekeeping missions, sometimes claimed 
to be humanitarian interventions, and adheres to a right of pre-emptive self-
defence. The United States may feel that it is not within their national 
interest to give the ICC, with a potential jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, the possibility to intrude on what they believe to be sovereign 
rights. The prevailing view seems to be that it is up to the United States 
alone to try individuals accused of a crime in connection with its 
international efforts. 
 In addition, the position needs to be interpreted with the United States 
as a permanent member of the Security Council in mind. Being in a position 
to veto Council decisions, its possibilities to manoeuvre within the 
international community are extensive. In fact, William A. Schabas has 
claimed that it is precisely concerns about the role of the Council, with the 
possibility that the Rome Statute could reduce its role and prerogatives that 
explains the hostility towards the ICC.291 From a political science 
perspective, it has been argued that the United States, by rejecting the Rome 
Statute and the ICC, expresses a preference for ‘hegemonic instability’. In 
short, this means that instability derives from the supposed hegemon, the 
United States, who finds itself in conflict with international institutions 
supported by other major States. This results in that other States only have 
the threat of negative sanctions from a weak institution or extralegal threats 
from the hegemon to consider, making it more likely that they continue to 
violate international criminal law with impunity.292
 In any case, it is unfortunate that the United States appears to have an 
increasingly hostile attitude towards the ICC and the crime of aggression. 
4.4 Consequences 
One cannot exclude the possibility that issues of sovereignty might lead to 
the crime of aggression remaining undefined and beyond the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. Therefore, it might be appropriate to examine how the crime of 
aggression can be pursued if this was to be the outcome. 
 As previously noted, customary international law might include the 
crime of aggression and the individual criminal responsibility for it.293 
However, without a provision defining the crime of aggression for the Rome 
Statute, an international institution with de facto jurisdiction over the crime 
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will be lacking. This would leave two, possibly three, options for punishing 
individuals for the crime of aggression. 
 First, there is a possibility of States using the universality principle as 
grounds for jurisdiction within its national courts, giving each and every 
State jurisdiction over a limited amount of crimes. Crimes generally seen as 
within the universality principle include for example piracy, war crimes and 
torture, because of either customary international law or multilateral treaties. 
It is not entirely clear whether the crime of aggression falls under this 
category. According to the prevalent opinion, only the State where the 
accused is in custody is free to prosecute him or her.294
 However, several problems arise from this option. Seeing as the crime 
of aggression is a leadership crime, the rules governing immunity will come 
into play if a foreign national court intends to prosecute someone high up in 
the hierarchy. In the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 
Belgium had issued an international arrest warrant against the foreign 
minister of the Democratic republic of Congo for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The ICJ held that serving foreign ministers would benefit 
from personal immunity in order to ensure the effective performance of their 
functions on behalf of their States. The absolute immunity enjoyed, i.e. for 
acts in official as well as private capacity, would also apply with regard to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.295 In addition, persons accused of 
such grave crimes may be difficult to physically apprehend if they are being 
sheltered by their home States, i.e. outside of executive jurisdiction. 
 A second option would be for the victim State of an act of aggression to 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime. However, this option has the obvious 
problem that a State recovering from an act of aggression might not be in a 
position to commence trial. It is possible, if not probable, that a victim State 
could be mentally and physically in ruins. 
 Another option would be for the Security Council to take action in 
accordance with chapter VII of the UN Charter. The problems with this has 
been emphasised throughout this thesis and will be briefly restated here. The 
Security Council is a political organ that takes action with States and not 
individuals as the primary objects. It has been very hesitant in branding 
potential acts of aggression as such, and has the obvious problem that a veto 
by one of its permanent members can block action. 
 However, it has employed the use of ad hoc Tribunals in the cases of the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to try individuals for their involvement in 
the respective conflicts. The ad hoc Tribunals were created during the 
course of conflict under chapter VII of the UN Charter, which meant that the 
States involved could not choose whether to accept its potential 
infringement upon their sovereignty or not. Working as form of political 
intervention bearing international criminal law characteristics, competence 
of the ad hoc Tribunals to try their nationals merely had to be accepted. The 
case with the ICC is different. It is created by a multilateral treaty and States 
are free to choose whether to accept its competence or not by becoming a 
Party. As has been shown by the above discussion on issues related to the 
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sovereignty of States, some States may feel that the infringement on their 
sovereignty is too considerable and therefore decide not to become a Party. 
Nevertheless, in the Tadic case the ICTY delivered a noteworthy statement; 
‘the sovereign rights of States cannot and should not take precendere over 
the right of the international community to act appropriately as they (the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY) affect the whole mankind’.296 
The main question is how this right should be exercised, with the ICC 
working as a strong candidate of being the suitable forum. 
4.5 Outlook 
In conclusion, the mere existence of the ICC and its potential jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression in particular has several areas of potential 
conflict with the concept of the sovereignty of States. One explanation to the 
conflict could be that the sovereignty regime set up by the UN Charter did 
not take into account the potential individual criminal responsibility for acts 
such as the crime of aggression. In fact, it has been noted that ‘the drafting 
of the wide and powerful prerogatives of the Council did not necessarily 
foresee the role of the future institutions such as the ICC’.297
 When examining the UN Charter, it is hard to disagree with this notion. 
Consequently, the existence of a permanent international criminal court like 
the ICC with a potential jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will 
probably always be questioned with arguments of sovereignty. The question 
is if concerns regarding the crime of aggression, particularly those of 
sovereignty, in the end will be too great to overcome. There appears to be a 
general view within the literature on the subject that it is highly unlikely that 
States will arrive at an agreement some time soon.298 Matthias Schuster 
even goes as far as proposing to remove the crime of aggression from the 
Rome Statute, as ‘the crime inherently defies attempts to define it’.299 
Admittedly, concerns of infringements on sovereignty combined with the 
generally time-consuming work of finding a compromise for a feasible 
provision amounts to a difficult hurdle to climb. Nevertheless, the recent 
work of the Special Working Group has shown signs of improvement. In 
any event, only time will tell if it amounts to an impossible hurdle to climb, 
when arriving at the 2009 Review Conference. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis opened with a statement of purpose and the presentation of 
principle questions. This chapter concludes this thesis by a presentation and 
clarification of the conclusions arrived upon. This will be done by dealing 
with the conclusions separately, followed by a segment containing 
reflections and recommendations for the future work on the crime of 
aggression. 
5.1 Conclusions 
For centuries, the involvement of individuals in acts of aggression pursued 
by States was not of particular interest in a legal sense. Focus was entirely 
devoted to whether the action by the State itself was reprehensible or not. 
The concept of just or unjust wars surfaced early on, followed by the 
Westphalian system were acts of aggression were pursued as ‘the 
continuation of diplomacy by other means’. The end of World War II, 
coinciding with the adoption of the UN Charter, brought about a change in 
this area of international law. Tribunals were established, such as those of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, to try individuals accused of involvement in several 
heinous acts of aggression committed during the war. 
 The Rome Statute establishing the ICC builds upon this by including the 
crime of aggression as a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, yet 
leaving it undefined. It should be fair to say that the crime of aggression 
probably exists as a crime of international law with the possibility of 
holding individuals criminally responsible. In fact, there appears to be a 
generally accepted view that it is leadership crime, i.e. only individuals at 
the policy-making level can be perpetrators, and that an act of aggression by 
a State is necessary for the possible crime of aggression to occur. 
Nevertheless, without a complete provision in the Rome Statute and the lack 
of courts trying individuals on counts of the crime of aggression, the 
question of what involvement by individuals is in fact punishable remains 
unclear. In any case, without de facto jurisdiction for the ICC over the crime 
of aggression, perpetrators are likely to escape prosecution, as it would be 
left to States relying on the universality principle or the State being the 
target of the acts of aggression to try them. 
 As a second question, this thesis set out to examine and pinpoint the 
main difficulties in trying to find a feasible provision on the crime of 
aggression for the Rome Statute. The answer can be sought in Article 5(2) 
of the same Rome Statute, stipulating that a future provision must come up 
with a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which the 
ICC shall exercise jurisdiction over it. These two issues, a definition and the 
conditions, have largely been dealt with separately and have steered 
discussions on a future provision. As concerns the definition, the difficulty 
has consisted of whether to opt for a generic or specific approach, the latter 
containing an illustrative or exhaustive list of acts amounting to aggression. 
The development in recent years to consider the issue in light of the 
technical aspects of the crime has seen a growing attitude towards accepting 
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a generic approach. In any case, the definitional issue has seen constant 
development within the different Working Groups. 
 With regard to the conditions, the issue of whether it is necessary that 
another organ, like the Security Council, first determine the existence of an 
act of aggression has caused difficulty. It continues to be a highly 
contentious issue with divergent views of States that are not easily 
reconcilable. Even though positions appear to be locked, there have been 
some developments with an apparent consensus on that a potential 
determination by another organ will not be binding on the ICC. 
Nevertheless, solving the conditions under which the ICC shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression remains hard work. As aggravating 
circumstances, issues of the sovereignty of States come into play when 
discussing a future provision on the crime of aggression. States could 
potentially feel that a provision on the crime of aggression will work as an 
infringement upon rights flowing from their sovereignty, such as 
anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defence.  
 The question of whether it is desirable or likely that a feasible provision 
is produced at the 2009 Review Conference is better suited for inclusion in 
the following discussion and will be dealt with accordingly. 
5.2 Reflections and Recommendations 
The conclusion that the crime of aggression probably does exist in 
customary international law is a positive thing. Perpetrators of such heinous 
acts should not escape with impunity. It its important that perpetrators of 
such acts are pursued for the crime they have actually committed, namely 
the crime of aggression. However, the possible existence in customary 
international law is of less use if it has to rely on States applying the 
universality principle or the exercise of jurisdiction by the victim State. In 
that case, there is an overwhelming risk that the crime of aggression will 
continue to be committed with impunity. The ICC as a permanent 
international criminal court with a potential jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression based on the territoriality principle or nationality principle, has a 
much better chance of making sure that the crime does not go unpunished. 
Thus, the work conducted on trying to find a feasible provision for the crime 
of aggression for the Rome Statute is highly important, as it must be of 
interest to the whole community of States that such acts do not escape 
scrutiny. 
 Concerning the definition itself, it is difficult to be entirely convinced 
on which approach would be preferable, a generic or a specific one. The 
respective approaches both have their merits and flaws. However, seeing as 
the generic approach has a growing number of supporters it is difficult to 
find arguments against why one could not well settle for it. What needs to 
be settled is not the perfect definition in a legal sense. It is indeed highly 
questionable whether such a definition even exists. Instead, it is necessary to 
find a political compromise among several possible legal interpretations and 
with the generic approach enjoying the support of the majority; it is 
probably a useful point of departure. Furthermore, a generic approach would 
benefit from following the differentiated line envisaged by the Special 
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Woking Group. Even though the crime of aggression undoubtedly possesses 
some particular features, such as the necessary involvement of an act of 
aggression committed by a State, there is a value in applying the individual 
criminal responsibility regime of Article 25 to it. For instance, its coherence 
with the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC on this issue could 
help in clarifying precisely what involvement by an individual is punishable, 
and thus satisfying the principle of legality. In addition, it helps in keeping 
focus on the crime of aggression rather than trying to redefine acts of 
aggression. 
 Undeniably, much work still needs to be done to find a feasible political 
compromise on a definition on the crime of aggression, such as finding a 
proper term to describe the conduct element and consequently what conduct 
to punish. Nevertheless, the arguments presented indicate that the Special 
Working Group should follow the route entered upon. It is not impossible to 
believe that this will result in a feasible proposal on a definition of the crime 
of aggression. If not in time for the 2009 Review Conference, then at least 
in the not too distant future. 
 The conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC over the crime 
of aggression has without a doubt turned out to be the major obstacle of 
finally de facto including the crime. Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute with 
its ambiguous wording that a future provision ‘shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’ has certainly not 
been of any help. Above all, the issue of the relationship between the ICC 
and the Security Council has been a constant point of controversy. The 
debate on the issue has seen a wide range of positions and States do not 
appear to be very flexible. However, the apparent consensus on that a 
potential determination by another organ should be of a non-binding nature 
gives some hope of compromise. 
 Just as with the definitional part, it is necessary for States to understand 
that a perfect legal interpretation probably does not exist and that political 
compromise is important. The frustratingly slow pace of the issues 
development indicates that the Special Working Group needs to allocate 
much time to the issue. A suggested way forward is to try to find minor 
points of consensus, or compromise, to move forward, just as with the non-
binding nature of a determination by another organ. However, it must be 
admitted that this might be difficult to achieve where States are reluctant to 
give up sovereign prerogatives, particularly those States that at the same 
time act as permanent members of the Security Council. It is highly 
unfortunate if concerns of sovereignty will work as an obstacle to achieving 
a consensus on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC 
over the crime of aggression. Punishing individuals for heinous acts 
amounting to the crime of aggression should be in the best interest of justice 
for everyone, and should not stall on concerns of sovereignty. However, it 
must be admitted that at the present such concerns in particular do work as 
an obstacle difficult to manage. 
 In conclusion, the main problem does not appear to be how to define the 
crime of aggression and to point out what individuals can be the perpetrators 
of it. Work on a definition is progressing and there is a general agreement 
that it is a crime entailing the individual criminal responsibility of 
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individuals at the policy-making level. The problem is to solve the 
relationship with the Security Council in the potential exercise of 
jurisdiction over the crime by the ICC. In addition, States hoping to arrive at 
feasible provision for inclusion in the Rome Statute also face an uphill 
challenge of trying to convince opposing States to forget about their fears of 
the crime of aggression as a limitation to their sovereignty.. 
 So where does that leave that state of affairs with the 2009 Review 
Conference rapidly approaching? Is it likely or even desirable that a 
provision will be adopted when arriving there? The answer to whether the 
adoption of a provision is desirable must be that it depends. If a proposal of 
high quality can be delivered that even prior to the Conference enjoys the 
support of a vast amount of States Parties, then the answer is yes. However, 
if the contentious issues related to a future provision cannot be worked out 
in proper time before arriving at the Conference, then the answer is no. To 
deliver a heavily disputed proposal at the Conference would probably entail 
the risk of doing more harm than good. The result could be that States 
would stand even firmer on their positions and feel even more reluctant to 
finding a political compromise. That would not be the ideal route to finally 
reaching the goal that thesis has considered; a feasible provision on the 
crime of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute. As the Special 
Working Group according to the roadmap adopted are to conclude its work 
in 2008, there is not much time left to consider the issues of divergence. 
Aware of the fact that some of the issues are progressing at a snail's pace, if 
progressing at all, it is hard to disagree with the general view in the 
literature that it is highly unlikely that a provision will be agreed upon in 
time for the Review Conference. Consequently, it is not very likely that a 
provision on the crime of aggression will be adopted at a future Review 
Conference. 
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Supplement A 
United Nations PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Preparatory Commission for the 
International Criminal Court 
July 11, 2002 
Original: English 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
New York, 1--12 July 2002 
 
Discussion paper proposed by the Coordinator 
 
I. Definition of the crime of aggression and conditions for the exercise 
of jurisdiction 
 
1. For the purpose of the present Statute, a person commits a ‘‘crime of 
aggression’’ when, being in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State, that person intentionally and 
knowingly orders or participates actively in the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
 Option 1: Add ‘‘such as, in particular, a war of aggression or an act which  
has the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, 
the territory of another State or part thereof’’. 
 
 Option 2: Add ‘‘and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act  
which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, or 
annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof’’. 
 
 Option 3: Neither of the above. 
 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, ‘‘act of aggression’’ means an act referred to in 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
which is determined to have been committed by the State concerned, 
 
 Option 1: Add ‘‘in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5’’. 
 
 Option 2: Add ‘‘subject to a prior determination by the Security Council of  
 the United Nations’’. 
 
3. The provisions of Article 25, paragraphs 3, 28 and 33 of the Statute do not 
apply to the crime of aggression. 
 
4. Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a 
crime of aggression, the Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has 
made a determination of an act of aggression committed by the State concerned. If 
no Security Council determination exists, the Court shall notify the Security 
Council of the situation before the Court so that the Security Council may take 
action, as appropriate: 
 
 Option 1: under Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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 Option 2: in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
 
5. Where the Security Council does not make a determination as to the existence of 
an act of aggression by a State: 
 
Variant (a) or invoke Article 16 of the Statute within six months from the date 
of notification. 
 
 Variant (b) [Remove variant a.] 
 
 Option 1: the Court may proceed with the case. 
 
 Option 2: the Court shall dismiss the case. 
 
 Option 3: the Court shall, with due regard to the provisions of Articles 12, 14  
and 24 of the Charter, request the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
make a recommendation within [12] months. In the absence of such a 
recommendation, the Court may proceed with the case. 
 
 Option 4: the Court may request 
 
 Variant (a) the General Assembly 
 
 Variant (b) the Security Council, acting on the vote of any nine members, 
 
 to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, in  
accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the 
International Court, on the legal question of whether or not an act of 
aggression has been committed by the State concerned. The Court may 
proceed with the case if the International Court of Justice gives an advisory 
opinion that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. 
 
 Option 5: the Court may proceed if it ascertains that the International Court of  
Justice has made a finding in proceedings brought under Chapter II of its 
Statute that an act of aggression has been committed by the State concerned. 
 
II. Elements of the crime of aggression (as defined in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court)* 
 
 Precondition 
 
 In addition to the general preconditions contained in article 12 of the 
present Statute, it is a precondition that an appropriate organ1  has determined 
the existence of the act of aggression required by element 5 of the following 
Elements. 
 
 Elements 
 
1. The perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of the State which committed an act of 
aggression as defined in element 5 of these Elements. 
 2. The perpetrator was knowingly in that position. 
3. The perpetrator ordered or participated actively in the planning, preparation 
or execution of the act of aggression. 
 4. The perpetrator committed element 3 with intent and knowledge. 
5. An ‘‘act of aggression’’, that is to say, an act referred to in United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, was 
committed by a State. 
6. The perpetrator knew that the actions of the State amounted to an act of 
aggression. 
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7. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a 
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
Option 1: Add ‘‘such as a war of aggression or an aggression which had 
the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing the 
territory of another State or part thereof’’. 
Option 2: Add ‘‘and amounts to a war of aggression or constitutes an act 
which has the object or the result of establishing a military occupation of, 
or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof’’. 
Option 3: Neither of the above. 
 
 8. The perpetrator had intent and knowledge with respect to element 7. 
 
 Note: 
 Elements 2, 4, 6 and 8 are included out of an abundance of caution. The  
 ‘‘default rule’’ of Article 30 of the Statute would supply them if nothing were 
 said. The dogmatic requirement of some legal systems that there be both intent 
 and knowledge is not meaningful in other systems. The drafting reflects these, 
 perhaps, insoluble, tensions. 
 
 
_________________ 
 * The elements in part II are drawn from a proposal by Samoa and were not thoroughly 
 discussed. 
 1. See options 1 and 2 of paragraph 2 of part I. The right of the accused should be considered 
 in connection with this precondition. 
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